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ABSTRACT

This dissertation studies the potential paradoxical effects of alliance participation.
Over the past two decades, alliance participation has become a popular firm strategy to
obtain benefits that are difficult for a firm to obtain on its own. Yet, as firms increasingly
participate in alliances, boundedly rational managers may not effectively manage all aspects
of alliances to achieve intended alliance outcomes. Paradoxically, alliance participation may
cause harm to the participating firms.
To unveil an alliance paradox, this dissertation first examined the relationships
between alliance portfolio attributes (i.e., alliance portfolio size, multilateral alliances,
alliance partner country diversity, and alliance type) and customer service quality in the U.S.
airline industry. Further, I examined whether alliance experience moderates the relationships
between alliance portfolio attributes and customer service quality. Altogether, five hypotheses
were tested.
This dissertation relied exclusively on the longitudinal quarterly data of nine U.S.
major airlines over a 20-year period between 1988 and 2007 that include Alaska Airlines,
American Airlines, America West, Continental, Delta, Northwest, Southwest, United Airlines,
and U.S. Airways. Data pertaining to alliance variables were collected from the Securities
Data Company (SDC) database. Quarterly service quality data pertaining to customer
complaint, mishandled baggage, on-time arrival, and involuntary denied boarding were
collected from the Air Travel Consumer Report published by the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT). To detect the temporal effects of alliance portfolio attributes on
service quality, a three-month lag was created between the alliances data and the service
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quality data.
The results show that although the relationship between alliance portfolio attributes
and service quality seems to be more complex than initially proposed, the overall finding
confirms the existence of an alliance paradox in that increases in alliance portfolio size,
partner country diversity and channel-dominated alliances (versus backward
competitor-dominated alliances) are associated with decreases in certain key dimensions of
service quality.
This dissertation seeks to make several important contributions. First, by exploring
the alliance paradox, this dissertation attempts to demonstrate that despite the anticipated
alliance benefits such as cost reduction or revenue enhancement, managers need to be aware
of the cost of alliance participation with respect to customer service quality, which has
paramount impact on firm performance. Second, this dissertation also contributes to services
marketing literature by investigating alliance portfolio attributes as antecedents of service
quality. Third, this dissertation investigates whether firm-level alliance experience moderates
the relationship between alliance portfolio attributes and service quality.
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I dedicate this dissertation to my wife Jun with love
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

One of the most important strategic decisions that managers often have to make is:
what is the most effective form of organizing certain activities? Managers typically have
three broad organizational forms to choose from: market, hierarchy, and alliances. Market
refers to transactional exchanges that occur in the arm’s length spot market. Hierarchy
occurs when a firm integrates activities into its own organizational boundary, either
through internal development, or mergers and acquisitions. Alliances, defined as
voluntary ongoing interfirm agreements (Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002), are an
intermediate organizational form between market and hierarchy.
Early inquiries of appropriate organizational forms focused primarily on the
dichotomous choice of market versus hierarchy. As early as 1937, in his classic essay
entitled “the nature of the firm,” Ronald Coase, a Nobel laureate economist, brought up a
puzzle: “[I]f markets are so effective, then why do firms ever exist? And, if firms exist
because they are in fact better than market at allocating resources, then why is the
economy not organized into a single huge firm?” (Silverman, 2002, p. 468). Coase argues
that the choice of market versus hierarchy is determined by transaction costs.
Drawing on Coase’ work, Oliver Williamson (1979) developed Transaction Cost
Economics (TCE) theory. Premised on the assumptions of bounded rationality and
behavioral opportunism, TCE postulates that the three specific characteristics of a
transaction — uncertainty, frequency, and asset-specificity — affect managers’ choice of
organizational form. For instance, when exchange hazards are low (i.e., low uncertainty,
low frequency and/or low asset specificity), market exchange is the appropriate form of
1

organization because it involves lowest transaction costs. In contrast, when exchange
hazards are high, hierarchy is the appropriate form of organization because the associated
transaction costs are lowest.
Over the past two decades, alliance participation has become an attractive
organizational strategy to enhance firm performance. It is evidenced by the explosive
growth of alliance formations. Das and Teng (1999) noted that alliance formation has
been increasing at the rate of 25% every year since 1985. Anand and Khanna (2000)
reported that approximately 20,000 alliances were formed worldwide within two years in
the late 1990s. This enthusiasm for alliances stems from the benefits that are difficult for
firms to obtain on their own. Some of the benefits include market entry, cost reductions,
and increased market competitiveness (Barringer & Harrison, 2000).
Consider the alliance formed between America West and Continental in 1995.
This alliance allowed both airlines to code share. Code sharing is defined as “a
commercial agreement between two [or more] airlines under which an airline operating a
service allows another airline to offer that service to the traveling public under its own
flight designator, even though it does not operate the service” (Rhoades & Lush, 1997, p.
109). Participating in code sharing alliances enabled both airlines to increase revenues
through expanded market scope, enhance passenger benefits, and reduce costs through
sharing airport facilities. First, this alliance allowed both airlines to increase revenue
through market expansion. Under the code sharing agreement, America West sold a
Continental flight under America West’s name (i.e., designator code) as if America West
operated that flight, and vice versa. Both airlines accessed a broader market without
operating their own aircrafts in the extended market. Often cited as an alliance success
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model, this alliance was said to generate approximately $40 million for Continental and
$30 million for America West in revenues each year (McCartney, 1998).
Second, the America West-Continental alliance also enhanced both airlines’
revenues because of their enhanced customer benefits, making other airlines competing
on the same routes unpopular. The America West-Continental alliance provided at least
two important benefits to their customers. First, by taking the allied flights, passengers
could have a seamless travel experience, i.e., reaching more destinations with one ticket
and without the trouble of re-checking baggage at connections. Second, passengers
obtained enhanced frequent flier program benefits by flying the allied routes. America
West’s frequent fliers could earn miles on Continental’s routes (e.g., Europe), where
America West did not fly to on its own. As a result, Southwest lost its customers to the
America West-Continental alliance and had to reduce its capacity between Phoenix (the
base of America West) and Houston (the base of Continental) by 10% in 1996 and 1997
(McCartney, 1998).
Third, this alliance reduced both airlines’ costs through sharing activities. Facility
sharing is a very common practice of airline alliances because economies of scale can be
obtained by sharing economic activities to reduce the production costs per unit. Airline
alliances often reduce costs through airport facility sharing, joint advertising and
promotion, and joint purchase of products and services. For example, Star alliance (a
large airline alliance) began sharing electronic ticketing services among its 15 airline
members in 2005. This service eliminated unnecessary operating procedures between
airline alliance partners and reduced ticketing costs up to $7 per ticket (Kleymann &
Seristö, 2004). Given the benefits of cost reduction, America West and Continental also
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shared their activities, such as joint ticketing and baggage handling at many airports.
Alliance participation seems to be an excellent strategy to enhance firm
performance. Yet, alliance management is difficult and time consuming (White & Lui,
2005; Ireland et al., 2002) because providing “seamless” travel services requires
“seamless” coordination and cooperation between alliance partners. On one hand,
alliance partners are independent entities after alliance formation in that there is no
hierarchical authority involved between partners and each partner retains its own
organizational autonomy. On the other hand, partners are also interdependent because
each partner’s cooperation is needed to accomplish the alliance tasks (Inkpen, 2001). This
interplay of independence and interdependence demands substantial organizational
flexibility, managerial time and effort to manage alliances. However, since managers are
only boundedly rational (March & Simon, 1958), they are limited in their available time
and effort. Despite their best effort, as the alliance activities become more complex,
boundedly rational managers may fail to effectively manage alliances.
The America West-Continental alliance backfired because the complexity
involved in managing the interdependent alliance tasks performed by independent airlines
led to a tremendous drop in service quality (McCartney, 1998). This alliance was
intended to provide “seamless” travel experience for passengers so that customers did not
need to re-check baggage at connections and could use one ticket to travel on partners’
flight; unfortunately, the expected “seamless” travel experience turned out to be a
“bumpy” ride for several reasons. First, airlines are inherently hierarchical organizations
with many system constraints and are not structurally flexible enough to change. Gregory
Brenneman, Continental's president and chief operating officer, said, "It’s hard to go out
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and change your system and move employees around that's what creates heartburn and
slows implementation down"(McCartney, 1998, p.B.1). Due to the limited availability of
gates at each concourse at Phoenix airport, it took quite a while for Continental and
America West to be able to operate from the same concourse at that airport. Also, When
America West sold tickets to Hawaii on Continental, the two airlines could not operate
from the same gate in the same terminal at Los Angeles International Airport. Such
structural constraints created enormous confusion at the airports. Passengers checked in
at one concourse, but later found that their flight departed from a different concourse on a
different airline. Their baggage was handled by a different airline without their prior
knowledge, or even worse, their baggage was lost.
Second, the required interfirm coordination may further tax the efforts and limited
available time of the already busy airline managers because simply putting each other’s
flight numbers on their own flights did not mean that their computer systems would
readily coordinate. Third, unlike R & D alliances in high-tech industries, airline alliances
are unique in that they involve the entire organization to jointly produce the service
experience, rather than just one group of employees. Regrettably, there is a general lack
of cooperation by the employees at both airlines. In Houston, Continental ground workers
often gave their flights preferential treatment over those of America West. In return,
America West’s treated Continental’s flight with similar attitude in Phoenix.
Consequently, the number of flight delays, late arrivals, flight cancellations and consumer
complaints of both airlines soared (McCartney, 1998). Despite the financial benefits to
both airlines and potential customer benefits, the alliance was terminated because the
alliance benefits did not outweigh the problems incurred.

5

This America West-Continental alliance failure indicates the potential existence of
a strategy paradox surrounding the relationships between alliance participation and
customer service quality. Strategy paradox occurs when “the same behaviors and
characteristics that maximize a firm’s probability of notable success also maximize its
probability of total failure” (Raynor, 2007, p. 2). Lewis (2000) stated that “paradox
denotes contradictory yet interrelated elements—elements that seem logical in isolation,
but absurd and irrational when appearing simultaneously” (p. 760).
An example of a strategy paradox is the 3M’s efficiency-innovation paradox. In
2000 when Mr. James McNerne, the former GE executive, took over 3M’s helm as its
CEO, he immediately adopted GE’s Six Sigma model to reduce costs and improve
efficiency at 3M. Shortly after the implementation of the efficiency oriented Six Sigma,
3M’s operating costs were considerably reduced, profits increased, and even the stock
market price rose. However, some unintended effect happened—the product innovations
miserably suffered because Six Sigma slashed investments in R & D programs and
changed its innovative culture. Before the implementation of Six Sigma, one third of
3M’s sales came from new products released in the past five years. A few years after Six
Sigma was adopted, this ratio dropped to one-quarter. The board and managers were
worried about the negative impact of Six Sigma on 3M’s innovation-oriented
organizational culture. Mr. George Buckley, 3M’s new CEO, said
[I]nvention is by its very nature a disorderly process…You can't put a Six Sigma
process into that area and say, well, I'm getting behind on invention, so I'm going
to schedule myself for three good ideas on Wednesday and two on Friday. That's
not how creativity works. (Hindo, 2007, p.9)

6

Recently, 3M reinvigorated its innovative culture by reversing course the application of
Six Sigma.
This efficiency-innovation paradox at 3M is analogous to the alliance paradox
investigated in this dissertation in that expecting the various alliance benefits, managers
are increasingly using alliances to improve organizational performance. Paradoxically, by
doing the things that are logical and rational in isolation, managers may unwittingly set
themselves up for other unintended or disappointing organizational outcomes. It is of
paramount importance to study strategy paradoxes to help both researchers and
practitioners to understand the complexity of multifaceted alliance participation
decisions.
Focus, Research Questions and Research Methodology

The purpose of this dissertation is to unveil the paradoxical effects of alliance
participation. As opposed to the general notion that alliance participation increases firm
performance, this dissertation studies the downsides of alliance participation by
examining the relationship between alliance portfolio attributes and service quality in the
U.S. airline industry. In his recent book entitled “Strategy Paradox,” Raynor (2007, p. 3)
stated that “the reason most business research misses the strategy paradox is that few
studies ever examine failure.” Even though alliance research has investigated alliance
failure (see Arino & de la Torre, 1998; Parkhe, 1993), those studies have focused
exclusively on the direct effects of alliance failure on the participating firms. Instead, this
study focuses on the detrimental effects of alliance failures on customers.
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Customers are an important but most ignored stakeholder in organizational
research. Peter Drucker (1974) stated that the ultimate goal of any organization is to
create a customer. Unfortunately, Brief (2003, p. 187) stated that “a piece is missing that
should receive significant attention by management and organization researchers: the
consumer.” Recently, scholars noted the importance of bringing customers into
management research in that neglecting the customer is incomplete for assessing
competitive asymmetries (DeSarbo, Grewal, & Wind, 2006), understanding the value
creation process (Priem, 2007) and in identifying sources of sustainable competitive
advantages (Adner & Zemsky, 2006). Srivastava, Fahey and Christensen (2001)
suggested that creating and sustaining customer value lead to sustainable competitive
advantage. Given the importance of customers, the fact that alliance research has paid
little attention to customers leaves an important gap in the alliance research. Even in
marketing literature where customers are a central research topic, scholars have lamented
that the empirical research examining the alliance effects on customers is “scant at best”
(Rindfleish & Moorman, 2003).
Shifting attention to the customers, this dissertation studies the paradoxical effects
of alliance portfolio attributes on service quality in the U.S. airline industry. An alliance
portfolio refers to all the existing alliances a firm simultaneously manages (Hoffmann,
2007). Since organizations are increasingly embedded in a collection of alliances, it is
important to understand how a firm can effectively structure its alliance portfolio. Even
though research on individual alliance management still warrants further investigation,
research on alliance portfolio management will enhance our understanding of the
complexity in simultaneously managing a bundle of alliances (Gulati, 1998), because the
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effects of alliance participation on firm performance depend more on the firm’s capability
in managing its portfolio of alliances than its success or failure in managing one or two
alliances (Hoffmann, 2007).
Service quality, the dependent variable in this study, is the “single most
researched area in services marketing to date” (Brown, Fisk, & Bitner, 1994, p. 33).
Extensive marketing studies suggest that service quality is positively related to customers’
behavioral intentions (see Cronin, Brady & Hult, 2000; Olorunniwo, Hsu & Udo, 2006;
Sanchez, Abad, Carrillo & Fernandez, 2007; Zeithaml, Berry, & Parasuraman, 1996). As
a result, provision of quality services improves the financial performance of firms (see
Aaker & Jacobson, 1994; Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984; Rust, Inman, Jia, & Zahorik, 1999;
Rust, Moorman & Dickson, 2002).
In the context of this study, provision of quality services is particularly important
in the U.S. airline industry because inferior services may receive not only negative
customer responses, but also government punishments. The U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) collects information of important service quality dimensions and
publishes airline service quality reports on a monthly basis. In an interview, disappointed
by a drop in airline service quality (e.g., increased flight delays and baggage losses), John
Mica, the chairman of the House Aviation Subcommittee, said “they [the airlines] can do
better and must do better, and if they don’t do better, Congress has authority to wield a
big stick” (McCartney, 2006, p. D.5). He even suggested that passengers sue the airlines
if the airlines did not live up to their customer service commitment (McCartney, 2006).
The U.S. airline industry provides a natural setting for this study for several
important reasons. First, airlines have enthusiastically sought an impressive number of
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and different forms of alliances, which differ greatly along the value chain, such as
alliances with hotels, car rental companies and other airlines. This variety of airline
alliances makes possible the empirical testing of the variables of interest. Second, the U.S.
airline industry provides rich archival longitudinal data sources that make this study
possible. Third, since the major U.S. airlines are at least dominant-business firms (Rumelt,
1974), the confounding effects of diversified corporate effects on the customer service
quality are less likely to be a concern because an airline’s revenues come primarily from
the passenger transportation business (Chen & Hambrick, 1995).
This research builds on the premise that effective alliance management requires a
great deal of time commitment and effort by managers to manage alliances in selecting
appropriate partners, adapting to, monitoring, coordinating, and controlling the alliance
activities. But boundedly rational managers are constrained by their limited time and
efforts (March & Simon, 1958), as alliance management complexities rise, the managers’
capability in effectively managing alliances to provide quality services may decrease.
Most of the research on alliance management capability investigates whether
some firms are more capable of managing alliances than others and what factors
contribute to such variances in alliance management capability. Researchers have found
that alliance management capability is a path dependent capability and that firms may
learn to effectively manage alliances from their previous alliance experience (Rothaermel
& Deeds, 2006). In particular, in the context of the U.S. airline industry, managers may
benefit from their previous alliance experience. For example, Continental expected that
its upcoming alliance with Northwest would be smooth because of the learning from its
previous alliance experience with America West. In an interview about Continental’s
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upcoming alliance formation with Northwest, Mr. Gregory Brenneman, the Continental’s
president and chief operating officer, said “when we started with America West, we were
earning our bachelor’s degrees…Today, we have our Ph.D.s” (McCartney, 1998, p. B.1).
A conceptual model is presented in Figure 1 to first examine the main effects of
the four portfolio attributes on service quality: alliance portfolio size, multilateral
alliances, alliance partner country diversity, and alliance type. These alliance portfolio
attributes are selected to answer four important questions: (1) does a firm’s alliance
portfolio size affect its service quality? (2) does the proportion of multilateral alliances in
a firm’s alliance portfolio affect its service quality? (3) does a firm’s partner country
diversity of its alliance portfolio affect its service quality? and (4) do different types of
alliances in a firm’s alliance portfolio affect its service quality? Drawing on the bounded
rationality argument, these four attributes (i.e., alliance portfolio size, multilateral
alliances, partner country diversity, and alliance type) are proposed as complicating
factors that require more of the managers’ time and effort. Hence, these four attributes are
hypothesized to be negatively related to customer service quality.
Further, drawing on the recent research on alliance management capability
(Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006), I examine whether firms with
more alliance experience are more effective in managing alliances to provide quality
services. Hence, firm-level alliance experience is included in the model as a moderator
and is proposed to alleviate the negative effects of alliance portfolio size and multilateral
alliances on service quality.
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H5(a,b):
Alliance
Experience
(Experience
with alliances)
(+)

H1: Alliance Portfolio Size (-)
Customer Service Quality*
1. Customer complaint
2. Mishandled baggage
3. On-time arrival
4. Involuntary denied
boarding

H2: Multilateral Alliance (-)

H3: Partner Country Diversity (-)
H4: Alliance Type (backward
competitor-dominated alliance ratio is
less negatively related to customer
service quality than channel-dominated
alliance ratio)

Figure 1: Conceptual Model of Alliance Portfolio Effects
on Service Quality
*Each dimension is tested independently
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This dissertation relied on a sample of nine U.S. major airlines, using longitudinal
data over a 20-year period between 1988 and 2007. The alliance data were collected from
Securities Data Company (SDC) database. To test the temporal effects of alliance
formation on service quality, the service quality data were collected with a three-month
lag after the alliance data from reports published by the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT).
Expected Contributions

This dissertation seeks to make three important contributions. First, this
dissertation contributes to alliance research by exploring the potential dark side of alliance
participation. In general, the preponderance of alliance research suggests that alliance
participation, on average, creates value to the participating firms. Expecting the benefits
that are difficult to obtain on their own, firms have enthusiastically sought alliances to
enhance firm performance over the past two decades. Both in academic research and
popular press, the general notion that alliance participation benefits participating firms is
well received. Yet, managing interdependent alliance activities performed by independent
firms to produce and deliver products/services creates substantial alliance management
complexity. Since managers are limited in their available time and effort, as the alliance
tasks become more complex, boundedly rational managers may fail to effectively manage
alliances and end up with disappointing consequences on firm performance. This
dissertation attempts to demonstrate that despite the potential alliance benefits, as the
alliance task scope, alliance task depth and partner diversity increase in a firm’s alliance
portfolio, the resultant alliance management complexity may overtax the managerial time
13

and effort, thus causing harm to firm performance. In unveiling this potential alliance
paradox, this dissertation may inform practicing managers of the unintended alliance
effects on customer service quality, which is a very important organizational performance
outcome. Thus, when managers make alliance participation decisions, they should also
consider the service quality issues.
Second, this dissertation also contributes to services marketing literature by
investigating alliance portfolio attributes as antecedents to service quality. To the best of
my knowledge, this is the first empirical study to date that investigates the alliance
portfolio effects on service quality. While the services and marketing research has studied
the antecedents of customer service quality mostly at consumer level, employee level,
and firm level and primarily relied on survey data, this dissertation uses longitudinal
archival data to extend service literature by investigating the effects of alliance portfolio
attributes.
Third, I intend to show that firms learn from their prior alliance experience to
reduce alliance management complexity, thus alleviating the negative impacts of alliance
management complexity on service quality. Previous alliance management capability
research suggests that alliance experience improves alliance performance (Hoang &
Rothaermel, 2005). However, little is known about whether alliance experience matters in
term of customer service quality. This dissertation also intends to fill this knowledge gap.
Organization of the Dissertation

The following section describes the organization of this dissertation and provides
a summary of each chapter.
14

Chapter one: Introduction
The overall objective of chapter 1 is to provide an overview of this dissertation.
This chapter first discusses the potential paradoxical effects of alliance participation on
service quality. Then, it provides a brief introduction of the research focus, research
questions and research methodology. The conceptual model is presented in Figure 1.
Potential contributions are also discussed.

Chapter two: Literature review
By reviewing pertinent literature, the primary objectives of this chapter are to
provide a foundation for the subsequent hypotheses development and research
methodology, and to discuss the nature of the airline alliance paradox. This chapter
consists of four sections, which are (1) a brief literature review of alliance literature, (2) a
brief literature review of service quality, (3) a discussion of the airline alliance paradox,
and (4) a chapter summary.
The first section reviews alliance research on alliance formation, alliance
performance, and alliance management. The alliance formation review briefly addresses
the question of why firms participate in alliances. The alliance performance review
investigates the extent to which alliance literature has studied outcome variables related
to customer services. The alliance management review focuses on the topics related to
alliance management complexity and alliance experience.
The service quality review section first illustrates why studying service quality is
important. Then, it identifies two knowledge gaps that this dissertation intends to fill. The
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first knowledge gap pertains to data and management in that the majority of extant
service quality research has relied primarily on the perceptual measures, using survey
data, while little research has used longitudinal archival data. The second knowledge gap
pertains to the lack of research on the alliance effects on service quality.
The third section focuses on airline alliance paradox. It first discusses the
definition of paradoxes, the importance of studying paradoxes, and then discusses the
nature of the airline alliance paradox studied in this study. At the end of the chapter, a
short summary is presented.

Chapter three: Research hypotheses
This chapter provides detailed discussions of each hypothesized relationship. The
main effects of four alliance portfolio attributes (i.e., alliance portfolio size, alliance type,
multilateral alliances, and alliance partner country diversity) are first hypothesized. Then,
firms with more general alliance experience are hypothesized to have higher capability in
managing alliances. Altogether, five hypotheses are proposed.

Chapter four: Research method
Chapter 4 consists of two sections: data collection and hypotheses testing. The
first section describes the detailed procedure of data collection and measurement and
coding of the dependent variable, independent variables, moderating variable, and control
variables. In the second section, specific statistical procedures to test the hypotheses and
test results are presented.
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Chapter five: Discussion
This chapter is divided into four sections. First, it provides a discussion of results
reported in chapter 4. The second section discusses the limitations of this dissertation and
implications for future research. The third section discusses the implications for managers.
The last section provides the conclusion of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

By reviewing the pertinent literature, the purposes of this chapter are to justify the
need to unveil the alliance paradox, provide theoretical foundations for advancing
hypotheses presented in Figure 1, and provide rationale for the methodology employed in
this dissertation (i.e., use of longitudinal archival data). The literature review is organized
into four sections: alliance, service quality, airline alliance paradox and a summary.
The review of alliance literature revolves around three questions. The first
question is concerned with, why do firms form alliances? To answer this question, the
dominant theoretical frameworks and the relevant empirical studies are briefly reviewed.
The second question focuses on the extent to which the alliance literature has studied the
relationships between alliance participation and service quality. The third question asks,
how can firms effectively manage alliances? To answer this question, the alliance
literature pertaining to alliance management challenges and alliance experience is
reviewed.
The review of service quality literature discusses the importance of service quality,
and identifies the knowledge gaps pertaining to data and measurement of service quality
and the antecedents of service quality. This review of service quality literature intends to
(1) justify the approach of measuring customer service quality used in this dissertation
and explain the advantages of using longitudinal archival data; and (2) suggest that little
service quality research has investigated the alliance variables as antecedents of service
quality.
The third section of this literature review is concerned with airline alliance
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paradox. This section first defines paradoxes, discusses the importance of studying
paradoxes, and then discusses the nature of the airline alliance paradox. At the end of the
chapter, a chapter summary is provided.
A Brief Review of Alliance Literature

For clarity, definitions of alliances, multilateral alliances, alliance networks and
alliance portfolios are warranted, because these terms are closely related but distinct
constructs. Alliances refer to “cooperative arrangements between two or more firms to
improve their competitive position and performance by sharing resources” (Ireland, Hitt
& Vaidyanath, 2002, p. 413). Alliances encompass a broad range of interfirm
collaborations such as joint ventures, licensing agreements, research and development
projects, joint purchasing, and manufacturing activities (Barringer & Harrison, 2000;
Ring & Van de Ven, 1994).
An alliance can be further classified as a bilateral or a multilateral alliance based
on the number of partners involved in an alliance. A bilateral alliance is characterized
with dyadic interfirm collaborations between two partners. In contrast, a multilateral
alliance involves at least three alliance partners. Some scholars also use multiparty
alliances (Zeng & Chen, 2003), multifirm alliances (Hwang & Burgers, 1997), and
alliance constellations (Das & Teng, 2002; Lazzarini, 2007) to refer to multilateral
alliances. This distinction between bilateral and multilateral alliances is important,
because bilateral and multilateral alliances differ substantially with respect to alliance
management complexities such as governance complexity, coordination costs, transaction
uncertainty, degree of opportunism, and payoff structures (Hwang & Burgers, 1997; Das
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& Teng, 2002; Zeng & Chen, 2003).
Recently, academic attention has shifted from single alliance management to
alliance portfolio management. Hoffman (2007) argued that the effects of a firm’s
alliance strategy do not simply depend on the success or failure of managing one or two
alliances but on the success of failure of its bundle of alliances. While both bilateral and
multilateral alliances describe single alliances, scholars use ‘alliance network’ and
‘alliance portfolio’ to describe multiple alliances. An alliance network is a set of alliances
connected by a focal firm (Jarrilo, 1988). Since network ties and tie strengths are not the
focus of this dissertation, I use ‘alliance portfolio,’ which is similar to the concept of
egocentric alliance network, to refer to all the existing alliances the focal firm has
(Hoffman, 2007).
The next section briefly reviews the literature on alliance formation. Since there
are several excellent comprehensive literature reviews on alliance formation (for reviews,
see Barringer & Harrison, 2000; Inkpen, 2001; Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002), a brief
review is given on how the dominant organizational theories—transaction cost economics,
resource dependence theory, institutional theory, resource based view, learning theory,
and strategic behavior—relate to alliance formation.
Alliance formation

Few managerial decisions are as important as the choices of appropriate
organizational forms. That is, where certain organizational activities should be carried out:
whether an activity should be (1) performed in the arm’s length market exchange (i.e.,
market); (2) internalized within organizational boundary through internal development, or
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through merger and acquisition (i.e., hierarchy); or (3) jointly performed through
alliances. Hierarchy uses authority to create and coordinate the organizational activities.
Market suggests that activities are performed and coordinated between the supplier and
buyers by the price mechanism (Adler, 2001). Alliances are an intermediate
organizational form between hierarchy and market such that firms are independent
entities after alliance formation thus activities are not coordinated through internal
authority; and also firms are interdependent on each other to perform the activities which
price mechanisms are not sufficient to coordinate.
In the past two decades, alliances, the intermediate form of organization, have
become increasingly popular. In the following section, the alliance literature on the
determinants of alliance formation is presented.

Transaction cost economics
Based on Coase’s work, Oliver Williamson (1979, 1985) developed transaction
cost economics (TCE) into “one of the most prominent and influential developments in
the social sciences” (David & Han, 2004, p. 39). Predicated on the assumptions of
behavioral opportunism and bounded rationality, TCE postulates that the exchange
hazards arising from transaction costs–asset specificity, uncertainty, and
frequency—determine the choice of organizational form among market, hierarchy, and
hybrid (e.g., alliances). High asset specificity of a transaction occurs when the assets in a
transaction are valued much lower if they are redeployed outside the transaction
relationship. The level of environmental uncertainty is positively related to performance
hazards. Frequent transactions require high monitoring costs. TCE predicts, for example,
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that transactions with low asset specificity should be performed in market, transactions
with intermediate asset specificity in hybrid form (e.g., alliances), and transactions with
high asset specificity in hierarchy (David & Han, 2004).

Agency theory
Due to the separation of ownership and control between the managers and
shareholders, agency theory seeks to explain why managers’ choices of organizational
forms arise from agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency problems arise
from information asymmetry, monitoring problems and moral hazard (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Information asymmetry occurs when the managers have more information than others.
Monitoring problems refer to the difficulties in observing and evaluating the managers’
performance. Moral hazards occur when the goals of self-interested managers and their
level of risk taking propensity differ from those of shareholders. Scholars have used
agency perspectives to investigate how agency problems influence the managerial
decisions in participating in alliances. For example, Reuer and Ragozzino (2006)
investigated whether the composition of a firm’s alliance portfolio can be explained by
agency variables. On a sample of over 300 U.S. manufacturing firms, they found support
for their agency prediction such that when the internal officers and directors own lower
level of the focal firm’s equity, the alliance portfolio tends to be more extensive.

Resource based view
In contrast to TCE, which focuses on transaction cost minimization, resource
based view explains alliance formations are motivated by profit maximization (Colombo,
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2003; Das & Teng, 2000; Lavie, 2006). According to resource based view, when a firm
possesses valuable, rare, difficult-to-imitable, and non-substitutable resources and
capabilities, it is expected to obtain sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991).
Alliance participation allows firms to “locate the optimal resource configuration in which
the value of their resources is maximized relative to other possible combinations”
(Ireland et al., 2002, p. 427). To configure optimal resources, research has examined
whether alliance formation decisions are influenced by the resource stocks and
capabilities of both the focal firm and of its potential partners (Stuart, 2000). For example,
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) found that the more industry employers the top
managers have in the past, the more alliances the top managers’ current firm has. Hitt et
al. (2000) found that in emerging economies, firms tend to form alliances with firms that
possessed more financial assets and higher technological capabilities.

Learning theory
Learning has become a popular organizational theory to explain firm behaviors
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; March, 1991). Interfirm learning is another important
rationale for alliance formation. Interfirm learning refers to “any addition to a firm’s set
of capabilities obtained through interaction with alliance partners” (Colombo, 2003, p.
1212). For example, Rothaermel and Deeds (2004) found that on a sample of 325
biotechnology firms, firms explore learning opportunities in new product development
stage by forming R & D alliances, but sought exploitation alliances (e.g., clinical trials) to
further learn about market development.
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Resource dependence theory
From a sociological, open system perspective, resource dependence theory posits
that firms form alliances to manage their dependencies on the external resources (Pfeffer
& Salancik,1978). Firms are in constant exchange of resources with the external
environment to support their operations. During such resource exchanges, power
imbalances occur due to the differences in the level of resource dependences among the
parties. Alliance participation provides opportunities to increase a focal firm’s power in
its exchange with the external environment by increasing other firms’ dependence on the
focal firm, and decreasing its own dependence on other firms. For example, Gulati and
Gargiulo (1999) found that as the level of resource interdependence between firms grew,
the possibility of alliances formation increased.

Institutional theory
Also rooted in sociology, different from economic explanations of alliance
formation (e.g., TCE, agency theory), institutional theory focuses on the effects of
institutional environments on firm behaviors. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that
the three pillars of institutions—normative structures, cognitive structures, and regulative
structures—shape and constrain managers’ choices of organizational forms. In other
words, managers are constrained by the institutional environment to conform to the
standard norms, because conformance provides legitimacy benefits that have beneficial
effects on firm performance. From this perspective, research has examined the extent to
which alliance formations are influenced by institutional factors. For example, Baum and
Oliver (1991) found that on a sample of 1,028 Canadian childcare services, the childcare
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services that formed partnerships with well-established community institutions had
higher survival rates.

Strategic choice
This perspective grew out of Michael Porter’s (1980; 1985) microeconomic
industrial organization (I/O) arguments that the industry structures affect firm behaviors
that result in the variances of firm performance (i.e., SCP). Drawing on these arguments,
alliance research has studied whether alliance formations are determined by industry
variables (such as interfirm competition). For example, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven
(1996) reported that the number of competitors in an industry is positively associated
with alliance formation rate because of the needs to deal with the squeezed resources,
stressed profits, and threatened survival. Silverman and Baum (2002) found that in
Canadian biotechnology industry, firms form alliances to foreclose their alliance
opportunities. In global airline industry, Gimeno (2004) found that a focal firm’s alliance
formation was influenced by its rivals’ alliance formation patterns.
In sum, this section of alliance formation review intends to investigate what
factors drive firms to participate in alliances. This review suggests that expecting
potential alliance benefits, firms participate in alliances under various circumstances. The
potential alliance benefits as indicated by these dominant alliance theories include cost
minimization from TCE theory, resource leverage and profit maximization from resource
based view, interfirm power enhancement from resource dependence perspective,
organizational legitimacy from institutional theory, interfirm learning from learning
perspective, strategic positioning benefits from strategic choice perspective. However,
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agency theory suggests that managers may choose to participate in alliances to minimize
their own employment risks and/or optimize their own compensation benefits rather than
the benefits to their shareholders.
Alliance performance

The purpose of this section is to investigate the extent to which the alliance effects
on customers have been examined in alliance research. Several approaches have been
used to measure the effects of alliance participation. Both subjective measures (e.g.,
partner satisfaction) and objective measures (e.g., financial performance, alliance survival)
are used in assessing alliance performance (Geringer & Herbert,1991). In general, there
are three broad categories of alliance performance measures: (1) financial performance
measures, (2) alliance relationship measures, and (3) strategic performance measures.
Next, I review the effects of alliance participation assessed by these different measures.
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Table 1: Selected Research on Alliance Formation
Authors

Major Theory
Major Findings
A firm’s technical, commercial, social capital and the number of important inventions
affect its the number of alliances formations.

Ahuja (2000)

Resource based
view

Chung, Singh, and
Lee (2000)

Resource based
view

Firms with complementary resources and similar status are more likely to form alliances.

Colombo (2003)

Transaction cost
and learning theory

When partners are technologically diverse, firms tend to use equity alliances to guard
against partners’ opportunism.

Eisenhardt and
Schoonhoven
(1996)

Resource based
view

Alliance formation is more likely in emergent-stage markets than growth-stage markets
and in markets with highly innovative strategies. The rate of alliance formation is affected
by the TMT’s size and previous industry exposure, and the level of previous positions held
by TMT members.

Gimeno (2004)

Strategic behavior

A focal firm’s alliance formation is influenced by its rivals’ alliance formation decisions.

Glaister and
Buckley (1998)

Transaction cost
and resource
dependence

Alliance formations are determined by partner size, geographical location of the alliance
and the industry of the alliance.

Gulati (1995)

Transaction cost

Alliances are more likely to be equity based if they have a shared R & D component and
if they are between firms from different nations. The greater the number of previous
alliance, and particularly equity alliances, between the partners, the less likely the alliance
is to be equity based.
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Authors

Major Theory

Gulati and
Resource
Gargigulo (1999) dependence theory

Major Findings
As the level of resource interdependence between firms grows, the possibility of
alliance formation increases.

Hitt, Dacin,
Levitas, Arregle,
and Borza
(2000)
Oxley and
Sampson (2004)

Resource based view When forming alliances, managers from emerging market emphasize partners’
financial assets, technological capabilities, intangible assets and willingness to share
expertise than managers from developed market.
Transaction cost

When forming alliance with a competitor, rather than abandoning potential gains
from cooperation altogether in these circumstances, partners choose to limit the scope
of alliance activities.

Poppo and
Zenger (1998)

Transaction cost and
learning

Integration of transaction cost and learning variables offer higher predictive power of
alliance formation.

Reuer and
Ragozzino
(2006)
Shenkar and Li
(1999)

Agency theory

When internal officers and directors own lower level of the focal firm’s equity, its
alliance portfolio tends to be more extensive.

Learning theory

When seeking foreign partners, local firms are likely to seek transfer of tacit or
embedded knowledge via equity joint ventures than via contractual ventures.

Villalonga and
McGahan (2005)

Transaction cost,
learning, resource
based view, and
agency theory

A firm with rich technological resources is not more inclined to pursue acquisitions
over alliances. The marketing resources of both the focal and target firms are either
irrelevant for boundary choices or favor the choice of divestitures over alliances.
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Financial performance measures

Does alliance participation affect the financial performance of firms? Financial
ratios have been used to examine whether alliance participation creates superior
economic value to the participating firms. Some commonly used financial ratios include
sales revenue (Luo, 2002), return on investment (Luo), market valuation at IPO
(DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999), market share (Dussauge, Garrette & Mitchell, 2004), return
on sales, return on assets, and return on capital (Goerzen & Beamish, 2005).
The empirical findings suggest that alliance participation has significant impacts
on the firms’ financial performance. For example, Anand and Khanna (2000) found that
when allying with producers and suppliers, small- and medium-sized firms increased
their return on assets and market share. Gulati and Higgins (2003) investigated how the
different types of alliances of new firms affect initial public offering (IPO). They found
that ties to the prominent venture capital firms were particularly positively associated
with IPO success. Goerzen and Beamish (2005) found that as alliance networks became
diverse, the focal firms’ return on sales, return on assets, and return on capital decreased.
Dussauge, Garrette, and Mitchell (2004) examined how allying with rivals affects the
market share of the partner firms. They found that the market share of the rival partners
changes more than that of non-rival partners.
There are two major limitations of using financial ratios to measure alliance
performance. First, firms may enter into alliances for other reasons than financial
performances such as legitimacy and interfirm learning. For example, some firms may
form an alliance to learn the technological knowhow from partners. Arino (2003) argued
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that financial performance measures are relevant only when the alliance partners set
explicit financial goals. Second, not all released accounting ratios are accurate or
reflective of the actual financial effects of alliances because the differences in accounting
standards and procedures in different countries confound the findings.

Alliance relationship measures

Despite the explosive growth of alliances, it is documented that over 50% of
alliances failed (Barringer & Harrison, 2000). This high failure rate of alliances suggests
that healthy and stable alliance relationships are difficult to maintain. This approach
focuses on how to develop healthy and stable interfirm relationships. These studies
examine alliance duration, termination, survival and renegotiation, mutual commitment,
and partner satisfaction (Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Poppo & Zenger, 1998; Saxton, 1997).
For example, Poppo and Zenger (1998) measured the extent to which the focal firm is
satisfied with the overall cost of the service, the quality of the output or service provided
by its partners. Parkhe (1993) studied the relationship between alliance structure and
alliance dissolution.
This approach has several limitations. The primary limitation of this approach is
that it does not reflect the performance asymmetry among the partners (Gulati, 1998). In
other words, a successful alliance does not benefit every partner equally, whereas a
terminated alliance does not mean all partners suffer. For example, Ross, Anderson and
Weitz (1997) found that on a sample of 255 insurance agent relationships, the partners
that committed fewer resources to the partnerships perceived higher alliance benefits than
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those that contributed more. Also, an alliance may be terminated because one partner
successfully acquired the knowledge it lacked before it entered into the relationship. Thus,
alliance termination does not always suggest unsuccessful results to the participating
firms. Second, ongoing alliances do not necessarily mean successful alliance
relationships. Gulati (1998) notes that problematic alliances continue rather than are
terminated because of organizational inertia and high exit costs.

Strategic performance measures

Strategic performance measures examine the extent to which partners gain
strategic benefits that may lead to competitive advantages. Strategic performance
measures include market entry, learning effects, and goal fulfillments, rate of patenting
(Shan,Walker & Kogut, 1994), product innovation (Deeds & Hill, 1996; Kelley & Rice,
2002), speed to initial public offering (IPO) (Stuart, Hoang & Hybels, 1999), and
customer orientation (Rindfleish & Moorman, 2003). For example, Rothaermel and
Deeds (2006) studied the relationship between number of alliances and firm innovation.
They found that the relationship is inverted U-shaped. Kotabe, Martin, and Domoto
(2003) examined whether technical exchange and technology transfer affect supplier’s
improvements in product design, process design, and lead time in automotive
manufacturing industry. They found that U.S. manufacturers improve their suppliers’
product quality through exchange of technical information.
In contrast to the above-mentioned supply-side strategic performance measures
that exclusively focused on the benefits to the participating firms, marketing and services
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literature suggest that firms can achieve sustainable competitive advantages only when
their services and products are valued by customers (Srivastava, Fahey & Christensen,
2001). With the exception of Rindfleish and Moorman (2003) and Bourdeau, Cronin,and
Voorhees (2007), few published studies have examined the alliance effects on customers.
This lack of attention to customers and services is not surprising, because in the
management literature, the role of customers is missing. Ford and Bowen (2008) counted
the mentions of “customer,” “consumer,” or “services” in the abstracts of nine premier
management journals, which include Academy of Management Journal, Academy of
Management Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Applied Psychology,
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process, Strategic Management Journal,
Journal of Management, Organization Science, and Personal Psychology. They found
only 139 mentions of the keywords in these journals between the inceptions of each
journal and the end of 2006.
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Table 2: Selected Research on Alliance Performance
Authors

Performance
Measure

Nature of the
Performance Measure

Findings

Afuah (2000)

Relationship with
alliance partners

Alliance relationship
measures

Technology obsolesce of supplier firms affects alliance
outcomes and performance of buyer firms.

Anand and Khanna
(2000)

Learning from
alliance partners

Strategic performance
measure

The type of alliance affects learning from a firm’s alliances.
Learning effects are stronger for JVs than for licensing
contracts and for R & D JVs than other types of JVs.

Almeida, Song and
Grant (2002)

Patent citations

Strategic performance
measure

Multinational firms perform better than alliances in terms of
patent citations because of their superior capability in
managing knowledge.

Arino and de la Torre Alliance failure
(1998)

Alliance relationship
measures

Trust and goodwill are needed to avoid alliance failure when
renegotiation of major changes takes place.

Barkema, Shenkar,
Vermeulen, and Bell
(1997)

Alliance relationship
measures

The longevity of an IJV is negatively related to the cultural
distance of the venture partners. The longevity of and IJV is
also affected by the previous venturing experience the
partner firms.

Alliance longevity
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Authors

Performance
Measure

Nature of the
Performance Measure

Findings

Dussauge, Garrette,
and Mitchell (2004)

Market share

Financial performance
measures

The market share of the rival partners changed more than that
of non-rival partners.

Goerzen and
Beamish (2005)

Return on sales,
return on assets
and return on
capital
IPO

Financial performance
measures

As alliance networks became diverse, the focal firms’ return
on sales, return on assets and return on capital decreased.

Financial performance
measures

Forming alliances with the prominent venture capital firms
particularly contributed to IPO success.

Innovation and
sales growth

Strategic performance
measure, and
Financial performance
measure

Firms that ally with large and innovative partners perform
better than firms that lack such partners. In addition, such
benefits are more salient for the small and young firms than
for old and large firms.

Gulati and Higgins
(2003)
Stuart (2000)

.
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Alliance management

Alliances are difficult to manage because of the various risks inherent in the
interfirm relationships. Barringer and Harrison (2000) provided a list of the various
alliance risks, which include loss of technological knowhow, management complexity,
interfirm cultural clash, and partial loss of decision autonomy. Das and Teng (2001)
categorized the various alliance risks into two major types of alliance risks. The first risk
is relational risk that refers to the extent to which partners are willing to cooperate. Due to
bounded rationality and environmental uncertainty, managers can never draft complete
contracts that anticipate all the possible problematic scenarios in the process of
cooperation. This contractual incompleteness gives rise to a variety of opportunistic
behaviors that may lead an opportunistic partner to focus on its own private benefits
rather than the common benefits to all participating firms. The relational risk
management focuses on curbing opportunistic behaviors.
Scholars have extensively examined the effects of interfirm trust and contractual
mechanism on opportunistic behaviors. Trust is defined as “a psychological state
comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the
intention or behavior of another” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 395).
Many scholars have suggested that trust is an indispensible element for successful
interfirm relationships (Ireland et al., 2002). Since trust is defined as the willingness to be
vulnerable to others’ behaviors, selecting trustworthy partners, effective communications,
and interfirm adaptation are necessary to generate trust (Das & Teng, 1998).
Trust is a necessary but insufficient condition for alliance success because blind
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trust does not benefit alliances. TCE argues that as the potential transaction costs increase
(such as uncertainty and asset specificity), the more comprehensive and specific the
contractual terms should be to guard against opportunistic behaviors. On the other hand,
formal contracts may be a signal for distrust and even cause opportunistic behaviors. Luo
(2002) found a positive relationship between cooperation and performance when
contractual terms are highly specific and flexible. Poppo and Zenger (1998) found that
firms tend to craft more complex and customized contracts as asset specificity increases
and evaluating difficulty increases. They also found that trust and complex contracts are
complements rather than substitutes in influencing satisfaction with alliance performance.
They suggest that managers tend to employ greater level of relational norms as their
contracts become more complex and customized, and use complex contracts as they
develop greater levels of relational governance.
In brief, to reduce the relational risks that stem from partners’ opportunistic
behaviors, the literature suggests that interfirm trust and contractual governance are
effective and complementary mechanisms. This underscores the importance of careful
partner selection, crafting comprehensive, flexible, and customized contracts before
alliance formation, and effective interfirm communication and adaptation after alliance
formation. However, given the effectiveness of these approaches to avoid opportunism, it
requires much of the managers’ time and effort to apply these approaches to minimize
relational risks.
The second risk is performance risk, which refers to “the probability and
consequences that a firm’s strategic objectives are not achieved, despite full cooperation”
(Das & Teng, 2001, p. 8). Alliance management complexity grows as the alliance task
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scope, alliance task depth or the partner diversity increases (White & Lui, 2005). Alliance
task scope refers to the area of the alliance task interface between the partners, and it
increases as the range of joint tasks covers broader geographic, hierarchical, market, or
technological scope of the joint task increases. Alliance task depth refer to “the intensity
of interaction between the partners and could be measured, for example, by the
man-hours that each devote to a common task” (White & Lui, 2005, p. 916). As the
alliance task scope or alliance task depth increases, the coordination needs require greater
amount of managerial time and effort to coordinate the alliance tasks. Partner diversity
refers to the extent to which the partners’ profiles differ. Even though resource and
capability complementarities are motivators to participate in alliances, the partner
diversity may also be related to coordination difficulties, because differences in national
culture, organizational culture and operating routines make an alliance difficult to
manage.
The four attributes of alliance portfolios under investigation in this dissertation,
which are alliance portfolio size, multilateral alliances, alliance partner country diversity,
and alliance types, illustrate the differences in alliance management complexity. First,
since alliance portfolio size is the number of alliances an airline simultaneously manages,
as alliance portfolio size increases, so does either the alliance task scope and/or depth.
Second, multilateral alliances differ from bilateral alliances in both alliance task
scope and alliance task depth. A multilateral alliance involves at least two partners.
Participating in multilateral alliances allows firms to access broader market scope.
However, multilateral alliances require greater degree of interfirm coordination and

37

mutual adjustments to accommodate the needs of multiple partners than do bilateral
alliances.
Third, with respect to the partner diversity, I focus on the alliance partner country
diversity. An alliance involving an international partner may be particularly complex to
coordinate because of the broad geographical scope, differences in the national culture,
operating procedures, managerial characteristics and so forth may require greater mutual
adjustments to achieve the alliance objectives.
Fourth, alliance types differ in both scope and/or depth. Airline alliances are
unique and different from the alliances in high-tech industries. Based on the alliance task
scope and depth, airline alliances are classified into backward competitor-dominated
alliances, forward alliances, and channel-dominated alliances. In channel-dominated
airline alliances that are defined as the alliances with partners from other industries, the
alliance scope and depth of interaction and related coordination costs are very low. For
example, when an airline forms an alliance with a hotel or a travel agent, the scope or
depth of interfirm interaction is low. Competitor-dominated airline alliances, defined as
alliances between airlines, are further classified into backward competitor-dominated
alliances and forward competitor-dominated alliances depending on the alliance task
scope and alliance task depth. Backward competitor-dominated alliances focus on the
input supply of the airlines (e.g., joint resource purchase) and forward competitordominated alliances involve direct interactions with customers (e.g., code sharing, joint
baggage handlings). For instance, a code sharing alliance, which directly interacts with
customers, involves more intense interfirm coordination effort and more employees of
partner airlines than does a channel-dominated alliance (e.g., an alliance with hotels, car
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rental companies) or a backward competitor-dominated alliance (e.g., an alliance between
airlines to jointly purchase fuel).
Alliance experience

Do firms differ from one another in their capabilities of managing these alliance
risks to derive the anticipated benefits? Rothaermel and Deeds (2006) found that the
alliance management capability of firms is systematically and heterogeneously distributed
across firms. Most of the work on alliance management capability focuses on alliance
experiences as a key source of alliance management capability. Drawing primarily from
organizational learning and dynamic capability arguments, this line of research suggests
that alliance management capability is a path-dependent capability accumulated from a
firm’s previous alliance experience (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006). Alliance experience
may help a firm build trust with repeat partners become more informed about the
operational models of the alliances and set up routines to solve conflicts. Research has
studied the alliance experience effects on alliance or firm performance, but not customer
service quality. For example, Anand and Khanna (2000) investigated whether a firm’s
experience in managing alliances is related to the firm’s ability to create value through
alliances.
In studying the moderating effects of alliance experience on the relationship
between alliance portfolio attributes and customer service quality, I focus on the general
alliance experience that refers to a firm’s cumulative experience with alliances
(Rothaermal & Deeds, 2006). Zollo, Reuer and Singh (2002) found that relation-specific
alliance experience has positive effects on alliance performance because it helps partners
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routinize the alliance coordination. However, Hoang and Rothaermel (2005) found that
the general alliance experience of the biotechnology partners is positively related to
alliance project performance, and relation-specific experience has a negative effect on
alliance project performance. Consequently, this dissertation focuses on general alliance
experience rather than relation-specific experience.
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Table 3: Selected Research on Alliance Management Capability
Author(s)
Anand and Khanna (2000)

Research Question
Findings
Do firms learn to manage alliances as their Significant learning effects in managing joint
alliance experience accumulates?
ventures are found, but no such evidence for
licensing contracts.

Deeds and Hill (1996)

Can a firm effectively manage a large
number of alliances?

When the number of alliances exceeds managers’
capability in managing alliances, benefits a firm
can derive from an alliance decreases.

Hoang and Rothaermel (2005)

Does alliance experience increase alliance
performance? What are the effects of
general alliance experience and
relation-specific experience affect alliance
performance?

The general alliance experience of the
biotechnology partners is, but not of the
pharmaceutical firms, positively affected joint
project performance. Yet, partner-specific
experience has a negative, marginally significant
effect on joint project performance.

Kale, Dyer and Singh (2002)

What factors influence firms’ ability to
build alliance capability and enjoy greater
alliance success?
What factors affect a high-tech firm’s
alliance management capability?

Firms with a dedicated alliance function derive
greater alliance benefits than those without.

Does relation-specific alliance experience
benefit alliance performance?

Relation-specific alliance experience has positive
effects on alliance performance because it helps
partners routinize the alliance coordination.

Rothaermel and Deeds (2006)

Zollo, Reuer and Singh (2002)

Alliance type and alliance experience
significantly affect alliance management
capability.
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A Brief Review of Service Quality

In organizational research, the role of customers is largely missing (Ford &
Bowen, 2008). Incorporating the role of customers into organizational research is
important, as Brief (2002) noted that “a consumer orientation to the study of
management undoubtedly will lead scholars into uncharted territories and eventually
will expand the field's boundaries” (p. 187). Among the various research topics
related to customers, this dissertation focuses on service quality, which is “the single
most researched area” in services marketing research (Brown, Fisk, & Bitner, 1994, p.
33). In the following section, I will review the pertinent literature to illustrate the
importance of service quality and identify the knowledge gaps in the extant service
quality that this dissertation intends to fill.

The importance of service quality

Service quality is one of the most important organizational outcomes in that
provision of quality services leads to favorable customer behaviors and consequently
enhances performance of firms (Heskett, Jone, & Loveman, 1994; Heskett, Sasser, &
Schlesinger, 1997; Zeithaml, Berry, & Parasuraman, 1996). A large amount of
research has studied whether customers exhibit favorable behaviors to the firms that
provide quality services (e.g., Bell, Auh, & Smalley, 2005; Eisingerich & Bell, 2008;
Olorunniwo & Hsu, 2006; Olorunniwo, Hsu, & Udo, 2006; Qin & Prybutok, 2008;
Rafaeli, Ziklik, & Doucet, 2008; Wall & Berry, 2007).
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Empirical evidence indicates positive effects of service quality and favorable
customer responses, which include repurchase intentions (Brady & Cronin 2001),
positive word of mouth (Swanson & Davis, 2003), customer loyalty (Tam, 2004),
customer satisfaction (Brady, Cronin & Brand, 2002), customer trust (Eisingerich &
Bell, 2008), and price insensitivity (de Ruyter, 1998). For example, Brady and Cronin
(2001) found when customers perceive the service quality is good, they tend to
repurchase more. Swanson and Davis (2003) found a positive relationship between
service quality and favorable word of mouth. Tam (2004) found that service quality is
positively related to repurchase intention, word of mouth, and customer loyalty. Brady
et al. (2002) found positive relationships between service quality and customer
satisfaction, repurchase intention, and word of mouth. Eisingerich and Bell (2008)
found that customers exhibit higher trust to firms that provide quality services than
those that do not. A positive relationship between perceived service quality and price
insensitivity was found by de Ruyter (1998). He observed that despite higher prices,
customers still remain loyal to the firms providing quality services.
The positive relationships between service quality and customer responses have
received empirical support in different regions and countries (Çalik & Balta, 2006;
Daskalopoulou & Petrou, 2005; Liang & Wang, 2006; Lymperopoulos, Chaniotakis,
& Soureli, 2006; Wong & Sohal, 2003). For example, on a sample of Chinese retail
stores, Wong and Sohal (2003) found that service quality is positively associated with
customer loyalty. Using questionnaires on a sample of 1,092 bank customers in
Athens, Lymperopoulos et al. (2006) found that bank service quality is the most
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important factor that influences customers’ decision in selecting their mortgage loan
providers.
As a result of favorable customer responses to their quality services, firms
can enhance brand equity (Bamert & Wehrli, 2005), efficiency, recruiting and
retention of talented employees (Luo & Homburg, 2007), and financial performance
(Aaker & Jacobson, 1994; Aksoy, Cooil, Groening, Keiningham, & Yalçın, 2008;
Anderson, Fornell, & Mazvancheryl, 2004; Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984; Rust,
Moorman, & Dickson, 2002). Brand equity literature indicates that “a firm’s good
brand image and strong public reputation represent another critical intangible asset
that has financial content and long-term value” (Luo, 2007, p. 77). Bamert and Wehrli
(2005) found that service quality is an important part of brand equity in services
markets. Efficiency refers to “the conversion ratio of organizational resource inputs to
desirable goal outcomes” (Luo & Homburg, 2007, p. 133). Luo and Homburg (2007)
found that when customers are satisfied with its service, the firm enhances its
advertising and promotion efficiency, because satisfied customers tend to spread
positive word of mouth and thus save its marketing investments. Further, they noted
that customer service has a positive influence on a firm’s ability in hiring and
retaining talented employees, because providing quality services implies a firm’s
financial strengths and attractiveness.
A large amount of empirical evidence suggests the positive relationship
between service quality and financial performance, which is usually measured with
financial ratios such as stock return (Aaker & Jacobson, 1994; Aksoy et al., 2008;
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Anderson et al., 2004) , return on investment (Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984), and
return on assets (Rust et al., 2002). For example, Aaker and Jacobson (1994) found a
positive association between stock return and service quality. Interestingly, they noted
that quality services are not only valued by the shareholders who are regular
customers of the firm, but also those who are not, because a firm’s commitment to
quality is viewed as a signal of its long-term promising performance. Aksoy et al.
(2008) showed that investors tend to buy stocks of the firms that provide quality
services. They noted that
[A] $100 investment in a portfolio of firms with high customer satisfaction and an
increase in customer satisfaction more than triples to $312. To put our results in
perspective, the same $100 investment in the S&P 500 grows only to $205. The
performance of a portfolio of firms with low customer satisfaction and a decrease
in customer satisfaction is significantly weaker, with the $100 investment actually
decreasing to $98. (p. 108)
Relatedly, Anderson, Fornell, and Mazvancheryl (2004, p. 181) observed that “for a
BusinessWeek 1000 firm with average assets of approximately $10 billion, a 1%
improvement in satisfaction implies an increase in the firm’s value of approximately
$275 million.” Anderson and Zeithaml (1984) found that service quality is positively
related to return on investment in mature industries. Rust, Moorman, and Dickson
(2002) found that quality improvements are positively related to firms’ return on
assets.
As opposed to the favorable customer responses to the firms that provide
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quality services, even loyal customers become the worst enemies and retaliate against
the firms that provide poor services (Grégoire & Fisher, 2008). In recent years,
customers have become more powerful with the emergence of internet social
networking websites such as youtube.com and myspace.com. Customers can make
their negative voices widely heard if they feel they have experienced poor service
quality. For example, after Apple refused to repair his personal computer under
warranty, Mr. Michael Whitford allegedly uploaded a video to youtube.com in which
he smashed his Apple computer into pieces with a hammer. Reportedly, more than
340,000 individuals viewed his smashing action video (McGregor, 2008). Also,
customers may voice their complaints directly to the top managers. In October 2007,
after his US Airways flight waited on the runway for three hours, Mr. Ron Dee started
sending emails to US Airways’ CEO and COO from his BlackBerry cell phone every
15 minutes or so, while he was stuck on the runway. Such negative behaviors from
customers are detrimental to a firms’ reputation and operations (McGregor, 2008).
Empirical evidence suggests poor service leads to negative customer behaviors
and decreased firm performance especially in the US airline industry. For example,
Forbes (2008) found a negative relationship between service quality and customer
complaints in the airline industry. Also, Zins (2001) found that poor service quality is
associated with low airline image, customer satisfaction and customer loyalty.
Wangenheim and Bayon (2007) found that when they experience an airline’s
overbooking problems, customers tend to reduce their future repurchases with that
airline. Luo (2007) found a negative relationship between customer complaints and
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stock returns. He observed that
[F]or Southwest Airlines, which has a $12 billion market value, a 1% increase in
DOT complaints could lead to a $262 million loss in market capitalization, all
else being equal. Furthermore, for American Airlines, which has a $6.5 billion
market value, a 1% decrease in DOT complaints could help the airline gain $138
million in market capitalization, a substantial increase in shareholder wealth.
(Luo, 2007, p. 82)
Knowledge gaps in the current customer service quality literature

Given the importance of service quality, two major limitations exist in the
current service quality literature that this dissertation intends to address. First, most of
the service quality research has relied on perceptual measures of service quality. This
approach is cross-sectional in nature and provides only limited information on causal
inference between independent and dependent variables. Second, the current research
on antecedents to service quality has primarily focused on the effects of customer
characteristics, employee management, and firm characteristics, while only limited
research has investigated the effects of alliances on service quality. Next, I will
review the literature to discuss the need to address these two limitations.
Data and measurements

The most widely accepted definition of service quality is provided by
Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry in 1988. Believing quality is in the eyes of the
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customers, they defined quality as “the consumer's judgment about an entity's overall
excellence or superiority…[service quality] results from a comparison of expectations
with perceptions of performance” (Parasuraman, Zeithaml & Berry, 1988, p. 15) .
This definition suggests that service quality is a function of the gap between
customers’ postpurchase evaluation of their service experience and their prepurchase
expectations. When the postpurchase evaluation exceeds the prepurchase expectation,
the service quality is deemed as positive. This approach is also known as the
disconfirmation approach (Spreng & Mackoy, 1996) because it contrasts the
customer’s prepurchase expectation and postpurchase evaluation.

Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry (1985) conceptualized service quality as a
function of five gaps, i.e., consumer expectation and management perception gap (gap
1), management perception-service quality specification gap (gap 2), service quality
specifications-service delivery gap (gap 3), service delivery–external
communications gap (gap 4), and expected service-perceived service gap (gap 5). To
measure service quality, Parasuraman et al. (1988) generated 22 survey items, which
were factor-analyzed into five dimensions: tangibles (i.e., physical environment,
facilities, equipment, and personal appearance), reliability (i.e., ability to perform the
promised service reliably), responsiveness (i.e., willingness to help customers and
provide prompt service), assurance (i.e., knowledge and courtesy of employees and
their ability to convey trust and confidence), and empathy (i.e., caring, individualized
attention provided to customers). Parasuraman et al.’s measurement of service quality
is widely known as SERVQUAL. Parasuraman et al. (1988) claimed that SERVQUAL
48

is a concise multiple-item scale with good reliability and validity that retailers can use
to better understand the service expectations and perceptions of consumers and, as a
result, improve service. The instrument has been designed to be applicable across a
broad spectrum of services (p. 31). In other words, SERVQUAL has two major
strengths. First, as opposed to objective measures, SERVQUAL relies on customers’
perceptions. Customers can evaluate the quality of a service more easily based on
their own expectations than on predetermined objective specifications. Second, since
it uses perceptual measures that do not involve specific technical specifications,
SERVQUAL can be applied across different industries.
Despite its strengths and popularity in services marketing research, recently
scholars have questioned the validity of the perceptual, survey based SERVQUAL
items regarding its inclusion of prepurchase expectations, scale dimensionality, and
item validity (Carrillat, Jaramillo, & Mulki, 2007; Coulthard, 2004; Ladhari, 2008).
Given these limitations of SERVQUAL, scholars have called for industry- specific
measures of service quality and studies using longitudinal data. Ladhari (2008)
suggests that service quality measures should be industry specific, because the
SERVQUAL items are inadequate to measure service quality in diverse settings.

Also, given the perceptual nature of SERVQUAL, the vast majority of service
quality studies have relied on cross-sectional survey-based data, but little research has
used objective, longitudinal archival data to study service quality. In a review of
service quality literature, Zeithaml (2000) called for longitudinal studies and said that
“virtually all of the research looking at the associations have been cross-sectional
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studies spanning companies and industries… Longitudinal approaches that involve
satisfaction and financial performance data in individual firms are a needed
approach…” (p. 73).

Employing longitudinal archival data allows researchers to test temporal
precedence, which is critical to detect causality (Cook & Campbell, 1979). Although
cross-sectional survey data can test covariations between the independent and
dependent variables, significant covariations do not mean that independent variables
precede dependent variables. In order to draw causal conclusions between antecedents
and consequences, longitudinal data provide a means to create a time lag between
independent variables and dependent variables. Wooldridge (2006) noted that

…observing the same units over time leads to several advantages over
cross-sectional data or even pooled cross-sectional data… the use of more than
one observation can facilitate causal inference in situations where inferring
causality would be very difficult if only a single cross section were available. A
second advantage of panel data is that it often allows us to study the importance
of lags in behavior or the result of decision making. This information can be
significant since many economic policies can be expected to have an impact only
after some time has passed. (p. 12)
Antecedents of service quality

In service quality research, various antecedents of service quality have been
extensively studied with different foci on customer characteristics, employee

50

management, and firm characteristics, yet only limited research has studied alliance
effects. First, a group of scholars have focused on the effects of customer
characteristics on their perceptions of service quality. The customer characteristics
include customers’ national culture (Laroche, Ueltschy, Abe, Cleveland, &
Yannopoulos, 2004; Tsoukatos & Rand, 2007), geography (Mittal, Kamakura, &
Govind, 2004), customers’ mood, emotions (White, 2006), age, gender and income
(Anderson, Pearo & Widener, 2008), and customers’ previous service experiences
(Rust et al., 1999). For example, Anderson et al. (2008) found that customers’ age is
positively related to customer satisfaction but their income is negatively related to
customer satisfaction.
Another group of scholars have focused on how to manage employees to produce
quality services. This stream of research has examined the various antecedents to
service quality that include employee training (Hui, Lam, & Schaubroeck, 2001; Yoo
& Park, 2007), service scripts (Shoemaker, 1996), attitude (Brady & Cronin 2001;
Lee, Lee, & Yoo, 2000), behavior (Babbar & Koufteros, 2008; Wall & Berry, 2007),
expertise (Doucet, 2004), employee commitment (Elmadag, Ellinger, & Franke, 2008),
and personality (Hui, Cheng, & Gan, 2003; Lin, Chiu, & Hsieh, 2001). For example,
Yoo and Park (2007) found that on a sample of 129 hotels when employees have
received service quality training and share an understanding of their visions, service
standards, and service performance results, firms expect higher service quality.
Also, some scholars have focused on the effects of firm characteristics, such as
price policies (Teas & Agarwal, 2000), service environment (Baker, Grewal, &
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Parasuraman, 1994), service climate (Dabholkar & Overby, 2005; Schneider. Ehrhart,
Mayer, Saltz, & Niles-Jolly, 2005), customer/market orientation (Chang & Chen,
1998; Voon, 2006), organizational capabilities (Roth & Jackson, 1995), private
branding (Herstein & Gamliel, 2006), and leadership styles (Clark, Hartline, & Jones,
2008). For example, Chang and Chen (1998) found market orientation, defined as the
extent to which firms focus on customer needs and preferences, is positively related to
service quality.
Yet, with the recent explosive growth of alliances, only a few studies have
examined the effects of alliances on customer services. Votolato and Unnava (2006)
studied the spillover effects of partners’ negative information on the performance of
branding alliances. They found that partners’ moral failures are more detrimental to
the branding alliance than the partner’s competence failures. Rao, Lu and Ruekert
(1999) investigated whether forming alliances signals information about the focal
firm’s quality to customers. They found that when a product has an important
unobservable attribute, consumers perceive its quality to be high when the focal firms’
partner can be sanctioned easily by customers in case of quality failures. Simonin and
Ruth (1998) found that the performance of the branding alliances affects customers’
subsequent evaluation of the qualities of each partner. Despite the limited research at
the alliance level, the empirical evidence suggests that alliances have significant
effects on service quality.
Especially in the airline industry, studies have shown that alliances have
substantial spillover effects on the focal airline’s service quality. Bourdeau, Cronin
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and Voorhees (2007) found that the service quality of Delta’s remote check-in service
operated by its partner has significant impact of customers’ assessment of Delta’s own
service quality. In a qualitative study, Weber and Sparks (2004) concluded that an
airline’s service quality is negatively affected in case of its partners’ service failure.
As a consequence, the focal airline may subsequently experience customer
dissatisfaction, negative word of mouth and low customer loyalty. Tsantoulis and
Palmer (2008) found that the service quality of airlines in alliances does not converge.
Their explanation was that “airline co-brand alliances are created for a number of
reasons other than promoting one shared brand with a consistent level of quality” (p.
61).
In sum, this service quality review suggests that service quality is a very
important organizational outcome in that provision of quality services is beneficial to
the firm’s customers and its financial performance. Yet, there are two major
knowledge gaps in the current service quality research that have been identified in this
literature review and this dissertation intends to fill. First, the vast majority of service
quality research has relied on the perceptual, cross-sectional SERVQUAL surveys to
study service quality. Scholars have called for use of longitudinal data (Zeithaml,
2000) and industry-specific measures (Ladhari, 2008) to study service quality. The use
of longitudinal archival data provides greater confidence in detecting causality by
creating time lags between independent and dependent variables (Wooldridge, 2006).
This dissertation uses industry-specific longitudinal archival data of US airline
industry collected from the US DOT’s Air Travel Consumer Report to study service
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quality (see chapter 4 for details of data collection).
Specifically, the four measures of airline service quality used in this dissertation
include consumer complaint, involuntary denied boarding, on time arrival and
mishandled baggage. These four measures have been used in other recent studies,
both separately and collectively, to study airline service quality (e.g., Lapre &
Tsikriktsis, 2006; Luo, 2007; Rhoades & Waguespack, 2000; Rhoades & Waguespack,
2008; Tiernan, Rhoades, & Waguespack, 2008; Tsantoulis & Palmer, 2008;
Waguespack, Rhoades, & Tiernan, 2007). Some scholars used some of these four
measures to study airline service quality. For example, Lapre and Tsikriktsis (2006)
used consumer complaint data to study the effects of airline learning in reducing
customer dissatisfaction. Also using consumer complaint data, Luo (2007) studied the
effects of customer complaints on airlines’ stock return. Waguespack, Rhoades and
Tiernan (2007) used three of the measures (i.e., on time arrival, involuntary denied
boarding and mishandled baggage) to compare the service quality between the US and
the European airlines. Other scholars used all of the four measures. For example,
Rhoades and Waguespack (2000, 2008) used all four measures to study the variances
in airline service quality. Especially, Tiernana et al. (2008) and Tsantoulis and Palmer
(2008) used these measures to study alliance effects on service quality. Apparently,
these four measures are valid proxies for airline service quality, and thus are all
included in this dissertation.
Equally important is the knowledge gap pertaining to the relationship between
alliances and service quality. To explore the antecedents of service quality, researchers
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have examined the various antecedents pertaining to customer characteristics,
employee management, and firm characteristics. Unfortunately, only limited attention
has been paid to alliance effects on service quality. Yet, several recent studies suggest
that alliances are an important source to understand the variances in service quality of
firms (e.g., Bourdeau, Cronin, & Voorhees, 2007; Weber & Spark, 2004; Tsantoulis &
Palmer, 2008). This dissertation fills the knowledge gap pertaining to the alliance
effects on service quality by introducing a set of alliance portfolio variables that are
important and have not received empirical investigation.

Airline Alliance Paradox

“Paradox denotes contradictory yet interrelated
elements—elements that seem logical in isolation but
absurd and irrational when appearing simultaneously”
(Lewis, 2000, p. 760).
“Paradox, the dynamic tensions of juxtaposed
opposites (Rosen, 1994, p. xvii)” (Lado, Boyd, Wright, &
Kroll , 2006, p. 115).
According to the definitions above, the most salient characteristic of a paradox
is its contradictory nature. For example, the famous liar paradox—a person claims
himself to always be a liar. This denotes a contradiction—is this statement itself a lie
or not?
Organizational paradoxes occur when rational actors make decisions or act to
increase firm performance but end up with unintended, disappointing effects on firm
performance. For example, Raynor (2007, p. 1) noted that
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…most strategies are built on specific beliefs about the future. Unfortunately, the
future is deeply unpredictable. Worse, the requirements of breakthrough success
demand implementing strategy in ways that make it impossible to adapt should
the future not turn out as expected. The result is the Strategy Paradox: strategies
with the greatest possibility of success also have the greatest possibility of failure.
Resolving this paradox requires a new way of thinking about strategy and
uncertainty.
Studying paradoxes helps managers and scholars recognize the complex and
often juxtaposed effects of firm behavior (Cameron & Quinn, 1988). “The use of
paradox can promote divergent or ‘oppositional’ thinking, cultivate interest, and
increase a theory’s generative potency…Companies may succeed or fail based on
differences in their capability to manage paradox” (Lado et al., 2006, p. 115). Poole
and Van de Ven (1989, p. 562) also noted that “use of paradox can deepen our
understanding by enabling scholars to address logical contradiction (or conundrums)
in a theory and to identify tensions and oppositions in order to develop more
encompassing theories.” Furthermore, Poole and Van de Ven (1989) pointed out that
most of the current theories are built on internally consistent theories of limited scope,
but relatively little attention has been paid to the opposing views of organizational
theories. They argued “internally consistent theories do not always lead to good
theories…because organizational theories attempt to capture a multifaceted reality
with a finite, internally consistent statement, they are essentially incomplete” (Poole
& Van de Ven,1989, p. 562).
Recently, there has been a growing interest in investigating paradoxes in
management research. For example, Audia, Locke, and Smith (2000) investigated the
paradoxical consequences of past firm success. They found that past success leads to
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greater strategic persistence after a radical environmental change, and such
persistence hurt performance. Sterman, Repenning, and Kofman (1997) studied the
contradictory effects of quality improvements on the financial performance of firms.
They found that when adopting quality improvement programs like TQM, firms
experience lower short-run financial performance, but have higher long-term financial
performance.
The paradox under investigation here is an alliance paradox in the U.S. airline
industry, which occurs as airline managers make rational decisions to enhance firm
performance by participating in a wide range of alliances, but firms experience
erosion in customer service quality as a result of failure to manage increased alliance
complexity. However, managing the alliances requires substantial amount of time and
effort by the airline managers. Since the airline managers are already busy individuals,
as the level of alliance complexity increases, they may fail to effectively manage
alliances. In situations where market is not a viable option, many firms prefer
alliances to hierarchical organization (i.e., internal development, or merger and
acquisition), because alliances require less investment, provide more flexibility, and
expedite market entry.
In the context of U.S. airline industry, the fierce competition puts airlines’
survival often at stake. Since the U.S. airline deregulation in 1978, due to the partial
loss of market protection of their markets, airlines have faced fierce market
competition. Between 1979 and 1989, 14 airlines exited the U.S. airline industry
(Williams, 2001), and 5 out of 11 U.S. major airlines (i.e., ATA airlines, Delta,
Northwest, United Airlines, and US Airways) simultaneously filed for bankruptcy in
2005. Airline managers constantly face pressures to contain costs and enhance
revenues merely to secure organizational survival. However, there are regulatory
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constraints that make going it alone unpopular. For example, market expansion is
severely constrained by regulations, limited availability of airport infrastructure, and
high acquisition costs of aircrafts. Some regulations stipulate that an airline needs
government approval to fly a desired route and that a majority of an airline’s equity be
held by a domestic organization. The limited availability of infrastructure (e.g.,
available terminal space and slots) is another important barrier for an airline to access
some markets on its own. Moreover, market expansion through merger and
acquisition incurs considerably higher costs such as purchase of new aircrafts to
accommodate the increased passenger volume. Alliance participation helps airlines
circumvent the above-mentioned constraints. For instance, a code sharing alliance
allows airlines to access the markets of their partners that have been already approved
by the government and to use their partners’ airport infrastructure (Kleymann &
Seristö, 2004).
Participating in alliances has emerged as an appealing strategy to reduce costs
and enhance revenues. In several aspects, alliance participation can help airlines
enhance revenues. First, participating in alliances with other airlines facilitates market
scope expansion of the airlines by avoiding the constraints of serving extended
markets by itself. For example, code sharing agreements allow airlines to expand their
market scope to reach their partners’ market. Also, airline alliances can increase their
revenues with enhanced customer benefits. Such customer benefits include the
frequent flyer programs with other airlines, hotels, car rental companies, theme parks,
and “seamless” travel to a greater number of destinations without the hassle of
checking baggage at connections.
The central theme of the airline alliance paradox lies in the fact that since
airlines are forced to reduce costs and enhance revenues merely to survive, alliance
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participation is a viable and attractive strategy. However, given these benefits, as the
alliance task scope, alliance task depth and alliance partner diversity increase, airline
managers’ capability of managing the alliance complexity may decrease. This may
lead to inferior customer service quality that has profound long term impact on firm
performance. Customer service quality is especially important in the U.S. airline
industry. Luo (2007) found that one percent increase in customer complaints could
lead Southwest Airlines to a $262 million loss in its stock returns, and one percent
decrease in customer complaints would provide American Airlines a substantial gain
of $138 million from the stock market. Thus, alliance participation creates a potential
paradox.

Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to investigate the extent to which the extant
research has studied alliance effects on service quality and provide a theoretical
foundation for the relationships presented in Figure 1 by reviewing the pertinent
alliance research and service quality research.
In the alliance section, I reviewed topics on alliance formation, alliance
performance and alliance risks. The alliance formation research suggests that firms
are motivated by various alliance benefits to form alliances, such as cost efficiency
improvement, fast market entry and competitive positioning. The vast majority of
alliance formation literature has been built on the supply-side arguments to investigate
how alliance benefits, costs and risks affect alliance formation, alliance structuring,
and alliance performance.
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The review of alliance performance suggests that the majority of performance
measures focused on the alliance benefits or risks that occur to the participating firms,
while little is known about how the customers are affected. Alliance research has
examined the various consequences of alliances concerned with the financial
performance (e.g., IPO, DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999), health and stability of alliance
relationship (e.g., alliance survival, Dussauge et al., 2004), and strategic benefits (e.g.,
innovation, Deeds & Hill, 1996). Yet, the alliance research overlooked the alliance
effects on customers.
The review of alliance management focuses on the alliance management
complexity issues, discusses how the independent variables in this dissertation vary in
term of alliance complexity, and also discusses how the alliance experience may affect
alliance performance.
The review on service quality first noted the limitations of current
measurement of service quality. Despite the compelling appeal of SERVQUAL, its
perceptual nature has resulted in a lack of research using longitudinal archival data.
However, recent marketing studies have began using objective, longitudinal data to
measure key dimensions of service quality. For example, Lapre and Tsikriktsis (2006)
and Luo (2007) used longitudinal customer complaint data as a proxy for customers’
perception of inferior service quality. Following this approach, this dissertation uses
objective longitudinal data to measure the key components of quality services.
The literature review on service quality antecedents suggests that various
antecedents of customer service quality have been investigated at customer, employee,
and firm level, along with a limited research at alliance level. However, no empirical
research has tapped into alliance portfolio effects as determinants. The empirical
results on service quality consequences underscore the urgency and importance of
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bridging the knowledge gap between alliance portfolio management and service
quality because quality services are positively associated with both customers’
behavioral intentions and the firm’s financial performances.
It is critical to understand how a firm can effectively organize its activities
around a portfolio of alliances in which it is involved in. Gulati (1998) noted
…as firms entered alliances with growing frequency, many prominent firms, such
as General Electric, Corning, Motorola, IBM, and Hewlett Packard, have found
themselves in hundreds of alliances. While issues concerning the management of
individual alliances are still important and merit further consideration, new issues
resulting from managing a portfolio of alliance have arisen. This opens up
numerous questions about the cooperative capabilities of firms. (p. 294)
The review of airline alliance paradox suggests that a paradox occurs when
rational managers intend to enhance firm performance, but end up with a
disappointing firm performance (Raynor, 2007). The review indicates the importance
of investigating organizational paradoxes. Particularly in the U.S. airline industry,
rational managers are pressured to cut costs and increase revenues. Participating in
alliances is a very variable strategy to obtain these objectives. However, paradoxical
effects may occur when the alliance management complexity exceeds alliance
management capability of the managers.
In conclusion, the extant supply-side perspectives of alliance literature have
largely overlooked the alliance effects on the demand-side, i.e., the
customers/consumers. Recently, management scholars noted that focusing on
supply-side perspectives while overlooking the customers on the demand side is
incomplete in assessing competitive asymmetries (DeSarbo, Grewal, & Wind, 2006),
and identifying sources of sustainable competitive advantages (Adner & Zemsky
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2006). Srivastava, Fahey and Christensen (2001) suggested that creating and
sustaining customer value that customers perceive through service experiences lead to
inimitable competitive advantage. Given the importance of customers, the fact that
little alliance research has paid attention to customers is an important and unfilled gap
in the strategy research. Even in marketing where the consumer has been a central
research focus, scholars have lamented that the empirical research examining the
alliance effects on customers is “scant at best” (Rindfleish & Moorman, 2003). To fill
this literature gap, this is the first empirical research to study the antecedents of
service quality at alliance portfolio level.
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CHAPTER THREE: HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Chapter 2 reviewed research pertaining to alliances, service quality and airline
alliance paradox. Built on the literature review, this chapter hypothesizes the
relationships presented in Figure 1. In the following section, the direct effects of four
alliance portfolio attributes on service quality are investigated: alliance portfolio size,
multilateral alliances, alliance partner country diversity, and alliance type. Further, I
hypothesize a focal firm’s alliance experience moderates the effects of alliance
portfolio size and multilateral alliances on customer service quality.

Hypotheses Development

Alliance portfolio size

Alliance portfolio size is the number of alliances a firm simultaneously
manages. Since participating in a large number of alliances potentially enables firms
to access valuable resources, technological expertise, and information, alliance
portfolio size may enhance firm performance. Several studies reported positive
relationships between the number of alliances and firm performance. Chang (2004)
found that internet startups’ alliance portfolio size is positively related to their speed
of IPO launch. Baum, Calabrese and Silverman (2000) found that in the Canadian
biotechnology industry, young large alliance portfolio size of the young firms is
associated with higher stock prices.
However, if alliance participation is always associated with higher
performance, why do firms not participate in as many alliances as possible? Deeds
and Hill (1996) argued that the relationship between alliance portfolio size and firm
63

performance is curvilinear, rather than linearly positive, because of diminishing
returns from excessive alliance participation. Diminishing return refers to the
declining alliance benefits to the focal firm as the alliance portfolio size grows beyond
an optimal number of alliances. Deeds and his colleagues (Deeds & Hill, 1996;
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006) reported an inverted U relationship between alliance
portfolio size and product innovations in the biotechnology industry. In brief, the
preponderance of empirical results suggests that the alliance portfolio size is
positively related to firm performance, at least before it reaches some optimal point.
In the context of this study, airlines have aggressively formed many alliances
to reduce costs and enhance revenues. The various forms of alliance arrangements
include code sharing, block seat sales, frequent flyer programs, joint maintenance,
joint advertising and promotion, sharing of ground facilities, joint baggage handling,
joint fuel purchase, joint computer reservation systems, as well as joint insurances and
parts pooling (Rhoades & Lush, 1997; Goh & Uncles, 2003). These various alliances
provide potential benefits to both the airlines and their customers. First, alliances can
increase revenue, reduce operating costs through economies of scale, and improve
market competitiveness. Agreements like code sharing facilitate market expansion.
Airlines can take advantage of economies of scale to reduce costs by sharing airport
facilities, joint advertising and promotion, and collective purchase of fuel and other
parts (Oum & Park, 1997). For example, using data on four global strategic alliances,
Iatrou and Alamdari (2005) found that airline alliances lead to an increase of 9.4% in
customer volume, because airlines can serve a broader market. Park and Zhang (2000)
reported that alliances increase airlines’ market share by 21% and decrease marginal
costs by 46%. Second, alliances also provide benefits to customers. For instance,
airline alliances allow customers to reach a greater number of destinations without the

64

hassles of baggage checking at the connections. By traveling allied airlines, customers
have more flight choices, enhanced frequent flyer benefits, and possibly lower fares.
Park and Zhang found that partners in international airline alliances can reduce fares
by 19%.
What is the relationship between alliance portfolio size and service quality in
the U.S. airline industry? Despite the aforementioned alliance benefits, I posit a
negative relationship between alliances and service quality for several reasons. First,
as the number of alliance grows, managers’ capability in preventing relational risks
decreases. Managers are intendedly rational but only limitedly so. March and Simon
(1958) argued that “the boundaries of rationality …have consisted primarily of the
properties of human beings as organisms capable of evoking and executing relatively
well defined programs but able to handle programs only of limited complexity” (p.
171). Participating in a large alliance portfolio increases the managers’ difficulties in
selecting partners, building trust, and crafting sufficiently complete contracts to guard
against opportunistic behaviors.
Also, increased complexity and uncertainty in operating procedures require
multiple routines to coordinate alliance activities. Since alliance partners are mutually
interdependent to achieve alliance objectives (Inkpen, 2001), mutual interdependence
leads to shared control and management, which increase the complexity of alliance
management. Because partners remain independent, there is uncertainty as to what
one party expects the other party to do. To alleviate the alliance complexity and
uncertainty, establishing stable interfirm routines and coordination enhances the
effectiveness of collaboration (Zollo et al., 2002). Firms need to develop multiple sets
of routines to develop, produce, and sell their services as well as a set of coordinating
routines to manage these activities. However, as the alliance portfolio size grows, the
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boundedly rational managers have limited time and effort in each alliance routine,
resulting in lower service quality. Thus, given the potential alliance benefits to the
firm, I expect a negative relationship between alliance portfolio size and service
quality.

H 1 : alliance portfolio size is negatively related to service quality.

Multilateral alliance

By definition, each alliance involves at least two partners. As defined earlier,
an alliance that involves more than two partners is referred to as a multilateral alliance.
In some circumstances, an alliance requires the involvement of multiple partners to
obtain greater alliance benefits. Participating in multilateral alliances has become a
popular practice. Makino and Beamish (1999) found that 55% of the 737 alliances in
their study are multilateral alliances. For example, Star Alliance, SkyTeam, and
Oneworld alliances enable airlines to reach broader markets and contain costs by
sharing facilities or joint purchasing input materials.
When participating in multilateral alliances, firms face higher complexity than
in bilateral alliances, which may incur substantial impacts on the focal firm’s service
quality. Zeng and Chen (2003) argued that multilateral alliances differ from bilateral
alliances in several aspects. In multilateral alliances, a partner is more likely to free
ride and to realize its own private benefits rather than the alliance’s common benefits.
Since achieving higher quality service incurs organizational efforts and costs (Roth &
Jackson, 1995) and opportunistic behaviors are more difficult to detect in multilateral
alliances (Zeng & Chen, 2003), a partner in a multilateral alliance is more likely to
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avoid the efforts and costs of providing quality services for other partners. Also,
Gulati and Singh (1998) noted that as the number of partners increases in an alliance,
the level of trust between partners may be lower. In multilateral alliances, trust
building is more difficult because it is less likely that a large group of partners will
trust all others in the alliance.
Greater interim interdependence in multilateral alliances requires more
coordination efforts (Zeng & Chen, 2003). Because partners in an alliance depend on
each other’s contributions, as the number of partners in an alliance becomes large,
interdependence in the service production and delivery process grows. According to
information processing theory, interdependence is positively related to the amount of
information a focal partner needs to collect, interpret and process (Bergh, 1998).
Altogether, these factors may constrain managers’ capabilities in ensuring service
quality as the proportion of multilateral alliances in an alliance portfolio increases.

H2: multilateral alliance ratio is negatively related to service quality.

Alliance partner country diversity

Allying with foreign partners allows firms to expand market access, and obtain
economies of economies of scale or scope. For instance, airlines form both
competitor-dominated alliances (e.g., with international airlines) and
channel-dominated alliances (e.g., with international travel agents, foreign hotel
chains) with foreign partners. Such alliances involve collaborations with managers
from with different national, cultural, social, political, and economic backgrounds.
I define alliance country diversity as the number of unique countries in which
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the partners in the focal firms’ alliance portfolio are based. I expect that alliance
partner country diversity of an alliance portfolio has negative effects on service
quality for two reasons. First, there are greater relational risks because partners from
different countries have different trust propensity. Parkhe (1993) suggested that trust
is highly “culture-specific.” Second, misunderstandings and mistakes are likely to
occur as country diversity increases. Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti (1997) stated that
when alliance managers share similar macroculture, the interfirm coordination is
easier and more effective. They explained,
…macroculture specifies roles, role relationships, and conventions—accepted
approaches and solutions to problems—to be employed by participants; thus
macroculture coordinates interdependent activities among independent entities so
that complex task may be completed. …Macroculture evolves out of the
institutional and national culture. (p. 929)
Similar institutional and cultural backgrounds may reduce misunderstanding between
the partners, and reduce coordination difficulties.
In addition, collaborating with a large number of foreign partners exposes the
firm to higher environmental uncertainty, which may also constrain managers’ ability
to manage the service production (Bergh, 1998). Together, these arguments suggest
that alliance partner country diversity may increase the level of alliance complexity
and thus have negative effects on customer service quality.

H3: alliance partner country diversity in a focal firm’s alliance portfolio is
negatively related to service quality such that the higher alliance partner country
diversity is, the lower its service quality is.

Alliance type
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Alliance is a generic term that covers a wide range of collaborative
relationships such as equity joint ventures, licensing arrangements, shared product
development projects, minority equity relationships, and joint purchasing and
manufacturing (Barringer & Harrison, 2000; Inkpen, 2001). Different types of
alliances affect the firm’s performance differently, since “the nature and type of
resource allocation will be different, as will be competitive dynamics, bargaining
power, and performance measure” (Inkpen, 2001, p. 411). Researchers have used
different typologies to classify alliances such as horizontal versus vertical alliances
(Kotabe & Swan, 1995), exploration versus exploitation alliances (Rothaermel &
Deeds, 2006), link versus scale alliances (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000,
2004), and channel-dominated versus competitor-dominated alliances (Rindfleish &
Moorman, 2003).
In this dissertation, I use channel-dominated and competitor-dominated
alliance typology. Rindfleish and Moorman (2003) defined a channel-dominated
alliance as an alliance in which the majority of its partners are from other industries.
They defined a competitor-dominated alliance as an alliance that is mostly composed
of competitors in the focal firm’s industry. They found that the decision to
participating in channel-dominated versus competitor-dominated alliances has
significant impact on firms’ customer orientation.
In the airline industry, airlines form competitor-dominated alliances with small
and large, domestic and global airlines to increase hub traffic, expand market access
and reduce costs. Also, airlines form many channel-dominated alliances with firms
from other industries such as travel agents, hotel chains, car rental companies, and
credit card companies to provide related services.
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White and Lui (2005) noted that the differences in alliance task scope and
complexity are associated with different level of alliance management challenges.
Further, in this dissertation, competitor-dominated airline alliances are classified into
backward competitor-dominated and forward competitor-dominated alliances to
capture the different level of alliance management challenges. Backward
competitor-dominated alliances focus on the supply activities on an airline’s value
chain (e.g., joint resource purchase), whereas forward competitor-dominated alliances
involve direct interactions with customers (e.g., code sharing, joint baggage
handlings). For instance, a code sharing alliance, which directly interacts with
customers, involves more intense interfirm coordination effort and higher
involvement of employees of partner airlines than does a channel-dominated alliance
(e.g., an alliance with hotels, car rental companies) or a backward
competitor-dominated alliance (e.g., an alliance between airlines to jointly purchase
fuels).
What is the relationship between alliance types and service quality? I expect
that backward competitor-dominated alliances are associated with the least amount of
alliance management complexity, channel-dominated alliances with the moderate and
forward competitor-dominated alliances with the greatest. In other words, backward
competitor-dominated alliances are least negatively related to service quality,
channel-dominated alliances are moderately negatively related to service quality, and
forward competitor-dominated alliances are most negatively related to service quality
for several reasons. First, forward competitor-dominated alliances, such as code
sharing and joint baggage handling that involve the highest level of intensity of
interfirm coordination and employee interactions with customers, require the highest
amount of managerial coordination effort. Second, in contrast, backward
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competitor-dominated alliances focus primarily on cost containments through joint
resource purchase and technical maintenance arrangements, which do not require
intense coordination or direct customer interactions, thus may require little managerial
time and attention. Third, channel-dominated alliances are only moderately complex
to manage. In channel-dominated alliances such as alliances with hotels, an airline
does not have to involve a large number of employees to intensely coordinate alliance
activities, or adjust its core operations to accommodate its partners’ operations as
usually the case in forward competitor-dominated alliances. But a channel-dominated
alliance requires a higher level of coordination efforts than does backward
competitor-dominated alliances, because a channel-dominated alliance involves
interactions with customers.
However, a close examination of the data suggests that nearly 70% of alliances
are forward competitor-dominated alliances. Since it may be possible that most of the
variances in customer service quality may be accounted for by forward
competitor-dominated alliances, I compare only the effects of the proportion of
backward competitor-dominated alliances in an alliance portfolio with that of
channel-dominated alliances on service quality such that

H4: backward competitor-dominated alliance ratio is less negatively
related to customer service quality than channel-dominated alliance ratio.

Alliance experience

Allying per se does not automatically lead to alliance benefits because the
relational and performance risks may dampen the anticipated alliance benefits.
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Managing these risks is a difficult organizational activity due to the inherent
complexities and uncertainties. Firms differ systematically in their capabilities of
managing alliances (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006). Therefore, alliance management
capability, defined as “a firm’s ability to effectively manage multiple alliances”
(Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006, p. 403), is a key source of competitive advantage.
Most of the research on alliance management capability investigates whether
alliance management capability is primarily derived from alliance experiences. The
notion of alliance experience is that firms may learn to effectively manage alliances.
For example, in an interview about Continental’s upcoming alliance formation with
Northwest, Mr. Gregory Brenneman, the Continental’s president and chief operating
officer, said “When we started with America West, we were earning our bachelor’s
degrees…Today, we have our Ph.D.s” (McCartney, 1998, p. B.1).
Learning theory suggests that the absorptive capability of the firm depends on
its existing stock of knowledge (Anand & Khanna, 2000). Cohen and Levinthal (1990,
p. 128) suggested that “prior related knowledge confers an ability to recognize the
value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends. These
abilities collectively constitute what we call a firm’s absorptive capability.”
Rothaermel and Deeds (2006) argued that firms with more alliance experience have
higher absorptive capability in learning to manage alliances, because firms learn to
effectively manage relational risks and performance risks by building interfirm trust,
becoming more informed about the operational models of the alliances, and setting up
routines to solve conflicts.
Recent research suggests that alliance experience has significant positive
effects on alliance performance. For example, Zollo and Winter (2002) found that
alliance experience with the same partner over time positively impacted the alliance
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performance of subsequent alliance between these two partners. Rothaermel and
Deeds (2006) found that a firm’s alliance experience improves its product innovations.
Reuer, Zollo and Singh (2002) reported that firms with alliance experiences in similar
technological fields are less likely to engage in post formation governance changes in
a subsequent alliance. Anand and Khanna (2000) found that firms with greater prior
alliance experience have significantly higher stock market returns from alliance
announcements than firms without alliance experience. Simonin (1997) found that
firms with greater alliance experience have higher abilities to effectively select
alliance partners and manage alliance conflicts.
In sum, I believe that firms with more general alliance experience have higher
alliance management capabilities and are thus more effective in managing alliances.
This dissertation focuses on the moderating effects of general alliance experience
rather than relation-specific alliance experience, because there is evidence that general
alliances may account for more variations in alliance performance. For example,
Hoang and Rothaermel (2005) found that the general alliance experience has positive
effects on biotechnology firm’s innovations rather than relation-specific alliance
experience. Thus, alliance experience may increase business process capabilities in
selecting partners, building interfirm trust, setting up effective interfirm routines in
the process of joint producing and delivering a product or a service (Ray, Barney &
Muhanna, 2004). Hence, firms with more alliance experience may be more effective
in managing alliances to ensure service quality.

H5: alliance experience moderates the direct effects of alliance portfolio
attributes on service quality such that firms with more alliance experience are more
effective in managing alliances to ensure service quality.
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Specifically, in this dissertation, I examine the moderating effects of alliance
experience on the relationship between alliance portfolio size and customer service
quality and the relationship between multilateral alliance ratio and customer
service quality. Thus, I further hypothesize

H5a: as alliance experience increases, the relationship between alliance
portfolio size and customer service quality becomes more positive (or less
negative).
H5b: as alliance experience increases, the relationship between multilateral
alliance ratio and customer service quality becomes more positive (or less
negative).
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHOD

This chapter focuses on the research methodology employed to test the
hypotheses and consists of two sections. The first section describes the detailed
procedure of data collection and variable measurements. The second section presents
the hypotheses testing procedures and results.

Data Collection

Sample
The hypotheses were tested on a sample of nine U.S. major airlines over a
20-year period between 1988 and 2007, which include American Airlines, America
West, Alaska, Continental, Delta, Southwest, Northwest, United Airlines and U.S.
Airways. According to DOT’s definition, an airline is classified as major if it has at
least one percent of total U.S. domestic passenger revenues. These nine major airlines
were selected because their data are most continuously available throughout the
20-year period under investigation except for America West that was acquired by U.S.
Airways in 2006. Also, other researchers have used these nine airlines in their
longitudinal studies related to customer service (e.g., Lapre & Tsikriktsis, 2006; Luo,
2007).
The timeframe between 1988 and 2007 was chosen for two reasons. First, only
after 1988 the data pertaining to the four dimensions of customer service quality are
consistently available from DOT’s air travel consumer reports. Beginning October,
1987, DOT required major airlines to report their monthly statistics of mishandled
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baggage, involuntary denied boarding, on-time arrival and consumer complaints.
Second, the SDC database, the source from which the alliance data were collected,
provides consistent and reliable alliance formation information only after 1988
(Sampson, 2007).

Measures
Dependent variable

To study the temporal effects of alliance formation on customer service quality,
quarterly service data were collected with a three-month lag after alliance data. Since
this is the first study that examines the alliance portfolio effects on customer service
quality using longitudinal archival data, the extant literature does not provide
guidance on the appropriate length of lag between the alliance and the customer
service quality data. I chose the three-month lag because recently Lapre and
Tsikriktsis (2006) chose a three-month lag to study how the U.S. airlines improve
customer satisfaction, also using the data published in the DOT air travel consumer
reports.
The quarterly service quality data were collected from Airline Travel
Consumer Reports published by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
between 1988 and 2007. Four key dimensions of service quality were used to measure
airline service quality, which are on-time arrival, involuntary denied boarding,
mishandled baggage, and consumer complaints. These four dimensions are widely
used to study airline services. For example, the popular Airline Quality Ratings (AQR)
created by Brent Bowen and Dean Headley in 1991 also uses these four dimensions to
measure airline customer service quality. Bowen and Headley (1991) argued that
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different from the SERVQUAL approach that relies on customers’ subjective
evaluation of the airline services, these four dimensions of airline customer service
quality provide consistent, comparable and objective data, thus, offering advantages
over “soft” survey data in conducting longitudinal analyses.
Instead of creating an aggregate measure of airline service quality like AQR,
this dissertation tests the hypotheses on each of the four dimensions independently for
two reasons. The first reason pertains to AQR’s weighting problem. AQR’s weighting
of each of the four dimensions was based on opinions derived from a survey of airline
industry experts. Yet, these industry experts may view the importance of these
dimensions differently than actual consumers. Second, testing these alliance effects
these four dimensions separately may reveal richer insights, because it may be
possible that alliances affect each dimension differently. Other airline service quality
researchers have also studied each dimension independently. For example,
Waguespack et al. (2007) compared key service quality dimensions between EU
major airlines and US major airlines and found that US major airlines have lower
on-time arrival rate but better baggage handling rate than their EU counterparts. Since
this dissertation adopts the perspective of service as a total experience (Bowen & Ford,
2002), studying each dimension independently allows this dissertation to detect
possible different alliance effects on each of them.
The data pertaining to these four dimensions between 1998 and 2007 were
collected from DOT’s official website (http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/). Since the data
published on DOT’s official website begin from 1998, the data between 1988 and
1997 were obtained from microfiche films. Next, I introduce the definitions and data
collection of these four dimensions.
Consumer complaints
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This statistic is the quarterly average number of complaints per 100,000
passengers. Passengers could file complaints directly with DOT by mail, phone, or in
person. The DOT consumer complaint report covers a wide range of service quality
issues in 12 categories, including flight problems (such as cancellations, delays),
oversales, reservations, ticketing, boarding, fares, refunds, baggage, customer service,
disability, advertising, discrimination, animals and others. Where quarterly data were
not available, the quarterly average was calculated based on monthly data.

Involuntary denied boarding

DOT defines it as the number of denied boardings per 10,000 passengers who
are denied boarding an oversold flight despite their confirmed reservations. This
statistic does not include passengers who are affected by cancelled, delayed or
diverted flights. Quarterly data were available and collected.

On-time arrival
This statistic is the percentage of flights that arrive on time. According to DOT,
a flight is "on time" if it arrives less than 15 minutes after the scheduled time shown
in the carriers' Computerized Reservations Systems (CRS). In fulfilling DOT’s data
reporting requirements, the reporting airlines are required to use automated and/or
manual systems for collecting flight data. The data of quarterly rate of on-time
arrivals were available and collected.

Mishandled baggage
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This statistic refers to the rate of mishandled baggage (i.e., lost, damaged,
delayed or pilfered baggage) per 1,000 passengers. Quarterly data were not available
for this dimension. The quarterly average rate was calculated based on monthly
mishandled baggage data.
Bowen and Headley (1999) noted that these four dimensions are a valid proxy
measure of the latent customer service quality construct, but differ in their
relationships to customer service quality. Put differently, the number of customer
complaints per 100,000 passengers, the number of denied boardings per 10,000
passengers, and the rate of mishandled baggage per 1,000 passengers are negatively
related to service quality, while on-time arrival rate is positively related to service
quality.

Independent and moderating variables

The data pertaining to alliance variables were collected from Securities Data
Company (SDC) database, a database widely used in alliance research (e.g., Oxley &
Sampson, 2004; Reuer & Ragozzino, 2006; Sampson, 2007) and is one of the most
comprehensive sources of information on alliances (Anand & Khanna, 2000). SDC
collects the alliance formation announcements and updates the alliance status daily
based on popular media publications such as SEC filings, trade publications, and
newswire sources. SDC provides comprehensive alliance details, such as contract type,
nationality of the partner, SIC code of the alliance partners, name of each partners,
description of the industry of the partners, synopsis of the alliance activities, and
alliance status (i.e., terminated, renegotiated, extended, expired, completed). Also,
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Anand and Khanna (2000) noted that the SDC alliance information is highly reliable
and consistent with other sources. For example, they found that SDC’s alliance SIC
codes accurate and consistent with LexisNexis database. Although there have been
some concerns about SDC’s accuracy of announcement dates, Anand and Khanna
(2000) found that in most cases, the discrepancy of SDC reported dates is within a
few days, or at most one or two months, after they verified SDC announcement dates
with various news sources, (e.g., news and wire reports, newspapers, magazines and
trade journals). Since this study examines the quarterly alliance portfolio effects
instead of monthly, the date discrepancy is not a serious issue for this dissertation.

Alliance portfolio size
The alliance portfolio size variable was operationalized as the logarithm of the
cumulative number of alliances each airline has each quarter. When an alliance
formation announcement is made and its alliance status is “completed and signed,”
the alliance was added to the alliance portfolio. When the alliance status indicates
subsequently “expired or terminated,” that alliance was counted off the airline’s
alliance portfolio size accordingly. For example, when British Airways and American
Airlines terminated their alliance in November 1998, that alliance was subtracted
from American Airlines’ alliance portfolio size in the fourth quarter of 1998.

Multilateral alliance
Following Gulati and Singh (1998), an alliance was coded as a multilateral
alliance if the alliance involves more than two partners. An alliance was coded as a
bilateral alliance if it involves only two partners. Multilateral alliance ratio was
calculated as the number of existing multilateral alliances divided by alliance
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portfolio size.

Partner country diversity
Following Goerzen and Beamish (2005), I first measured alliance partner
country diversity as the number of partners from unique countries in an alliance
portfolio. For example, if several alliance partners in an airline’s alliance portfolio are
from the same foreign country, they were counted as one unique foreign country. Each
foreign country was counted only once as a unique country in the measure of partner
country diversity. Partner country diversity ratio was calculated as the number of
unique countries in which partners are based divided by alliance portfolio size.

Alliance type: Channel-dominated alliance ratio vs. backward competitordominated alliance ratio
Following Rindfleish and Moorman (2003), when an alliance involves
partners from other industries (e.g., credit card companies, car rental services, and
hotels), it was coded as a channel-dominated alliance. For example, in December,
1991, Busch Entertainment and American Airlines signed a marketing agreement in
which American Airlines was named as the official domestic airlines for seven of the
nine Busch Entertainment theme parks. Competitor-dominated alliances are alliances
formed primarily between airlines (Rindfleish & Moorman, 2003). When a
competitor-dominated alliance formation focuses on the input supply and does not
have direct impact on customers (e.g., joint purchase of fuel, joint fleet maintenance),
the alliance was coded as a backward competitor-dominated alliance. The ratio of
each alliance type was calculated against alliance portfolio size.
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Alliance experience
Some researchers have used the number count of prior alliance relationships to
measure alliance experience (e.g., Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Zollo et al., 2002). Yet,
that approach overlooks the learning effects of alliance duration of each alliance.
Therefore, I followed Rothaermel and Deeds (2006) to measure general alliance
experience as an airline’s cumulative durations of each alliance and calculated the
alliance experience variable on an annual basis. For example, if an airline has four
alliances up to the year of analysis, among which two alliances have lasted 2 years,
one 10 years, and another 12 years, then the alliance experience score is calculated as
2*2+1*10+1*12=26.

Moderating variables
Alliance portfolio size*alliance experience and multilateral alliance ratio*
alliance experience are the interaction terms to examine the hypothesized moderation
effects of alliance experience. Following recommendations by Cohen, Cohen, West
and Aiken (2003), each independent variable was mean centered before they were
entered into the models. To check multicollinearity, I conducted post regression
analyses and found that all VIFs were below 10, suggesting that multicollinearity was
not a severe problem for these interaction terms (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Hair
1998).

Control variables

To control for the alternative explanations of the variances in the dependent
variables, this study includes four control variables that are firm size, airline type,
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temporal control for September 11th, 2001, and repeat alliances.

Firm size
Since larger airlines may have higher management complexity (Lapre &
Tsikriktsis, 2006) and form more alliances, I used the logarithm of quarterly average
number of employees as the proxy for firm size. Quarterly employee data from 1990
to 2007 were obtained directly from the DOT office. Because only annual employee
data between 1988 and 1989 were available from DOT’s Airline Employment Data
reports, quarterly data were interpolated for these two years.

Airline type
Airlines can be classified into either focused or full-service airlines. Lapre and
Tsikriktsis (2006) argued that focused airlines may learn faster than full-service
airlines to achieve higher level of customer satisfaction, because focused airlines have
a simplified operation, thus facilitating their coordination. Following Lapre and
Tsikriktsis (2006), Alaska, America West, and Southwest were coded focused airlines
because they focus on operations in North America only. American Airlines,
Continental, Delta, Northwest, United Airlines and US Airways were coded
full-service airlines because they operate both continental and intercontinental routes.

Terrorist attack on September 11th, 2001
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The third control is a dummy variable that controls for the effects of the
terrorist attack on September 11th, 2001. Rhoades and Waguespack (2004) compared
the U.S. airline service quality between 1987 and 2002, and found that airline service
quality improved in terms of on-time arrival, and reduced both involuntary denied
boarding and customer complaints after the terrorist attack in 2001. They explained
this improvement due to decreased passenger volume and consumers’ lower
propensity to complain as a result of their heightened concern over safety issues.

Repeat alliance
Fourth, I control for repeat alliances, because alliance with the same partner
may suggest lower alliance management risks due to higher interfirm trust and more
effective relation-specific routines of coordinating resources (Sampson, 2005). This
variable was measured as the number of existing alliances in an alliance portfolio that
involves at least one previous partner.
A total of 351 alliance announcements were obtained from SDC databases. To
match the service quality data with the alliance data, I applied the three-month data
lag as described earlier. Six hundred one observations (firm-quarter data entries) were
coded for the nine airlines over the 20-year period. Table 5 provides the summary
statistics and variable correlations. I conducted the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
analyses of all the independent and moderating variables and found all the VIF values
were below 10. This suggests that multicollinearity is not a severe issue in this study
(Hair et al., 1998).

84

Hypotheses Testing

To test the hypotheses, I used random effects panel data regression (also
known as random effects cross-sectional time series regressions) in Stata 10 (xtreg
procedure). Random effects regressions relax the assumption that firm specific effects
are correlated with the predictors in the model (Greene, 2003). I chose this analysis
procedure because the Hausman’s test results of the models did not suggest that fixed
effects regressions are more efficient (Greene, 2003; Wooldridge, 2002).
Tables 5-16 provide the test results of the hypotheses. Each hypothesis was
separately tested on each of the four dimensions of customer service quality (i.e.,
customer complaints, involuntary denied boarding, mishandled baggage, and on-time
arrival) in a hierarchical fashion. First, models 1, 3, 5, and 7 are the baseline models
with the control variables only. In models 2, 4, 6 and 8, the independent variables or
interaction terms were entered to test the hypotheses. The odd number Tables (i.e.,
Tables 5, 7, 9, 1, 13, and 15) report the results that use customer complaints and
mishandled baggage as dependent variables in the models, while even number Tables
(i.e., Tables 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16) report the results that include on-time arrival and
involuntary denied boarding as dependent variables.

Hypothesis 1: Alliance portfolio size

Hypothesis 1 predicted a negative relationship between alliance portfolio size
and customer service quality such that as alliance portfolio size increases, customer
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service quality decreases. Tables 5 and 6 present the analyses results pertaining to
hypothesis 1.

Customer complaint
The results of model 2 indicate that both the overall model (R2 = 0.135, Chi
square = 87.4, p < 0.01), and the incremental change in R square (F = 49.887, p <
0.01) were significant after alliance portfolio size was entered in addition to the
control variables in model 1. Alliance portfolio size (beta = 0.322, p < 0.01) was
significantly positively related to customer complaints, lending support to H1.

Mishandled baggage
The results of model 4 indicate that both the overall model (R2 = 0.081, Chi
square = 80.12, p < 0.01), and the incremental change in R square (F=18.654, p <
0.01) were significant after alliance portfolio size was entered in addition to the
control variables in model 3. Yet, alliance portfolio size (beta = -0.312, p < 0.01) was
negatively related to mishandled baggage. This result suggests that as alliance
portfolio size increases, mishandled baggage rate decreases, thus inconsistent with
H1.

On-time arrival
The results of model 6 indicate that both the overall model (R2 = 0.135, Chi
square = 87.40, p < 0.01), and the incremental change in R square (F = 21.673, p <
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0.01) were significant after alliance portfolio size was entered in addition to the
control variables in model 5. Alliance portfolio size (beta = -0.022, p < 0.01) was
found negatively related to on-time arrival. This result suggests that as alliance
portfolio size increases, on-time arrival rate deteriorates, thus lending support to H1.

Involuntary denied boarding
The results of model 8 indicate that both the overall model (R2 = 0.195, Chi
square = 88.43, p < 0.01), and the incremental change in R square (F = 15.594, p <
0.01) were significant after the alliance portfolio size was entered in addition to the
control variables in model 7. Alliance portfolio size (beta = -0.170, p < 0.01) was
found negatively related to involuntary denied boarding. This suggests that as alliance
portfolio size increases, involuntary denied boarding rate decreases, thus inconsistent
with H1.
In sum, H1 results indicate that alliance portfolio size has significantly
negative effects on customer service quality with respect to customer complaints and
on-time arrival but not on mishandled baggage and involuntary denied boarding.
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Table 4: Variable Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations
1
2
3
4
Mean
SD
1.272
1.087

5

6

7

1

Customer complaint it1

2

Mishandled baggageit1

5.156

1.465

0.123***

3

On-time arrivalit1

0.78

0.055

-0.386*** -0.342***

4

Involuntary denied boarding it1

1.004

0.874

-0.002

0.045

-0.114***

5

Alliance portfolio size it0 (log)

2.469

1.183

0.115***

-0.153***

-0.155*

-0.196***

6

Multilateral alliance ratio it0

0.175

0.163

-0.084**

0.163***

-0.008

-0.186***

7

Partner country diversity ratio it0

0.421

0.24

0.162***

0.096**

-0.023

-0.203*** 0.284***

0.020

Channel-dominated alliance
ratio it0
9 Backward competitor-dominated
alliance ratio it0
10 Alliance experience it0

5.058

5.759

0.021

-0.050

-0.054

-0.131*** 0.737***

0.051

0.056

1.891

2.229

0.069*

0.023

-0.091*

-0.146*** 0.734***

0.074*

0.135***

111.085

142.572

0.018

-0.019

96.358

135.065 -0.111***

0.321***

0.0282

-0.051

-0.915

17.636

-0.115***

-0.0657

0.091**

8

11 Alliance portfolio size it0 (log)*
Alliance experience it0
12 Multilateral alliance ratio it0*
Alliance experience it0

0.044

-0.146

-0.048

0.035

0.768*
-0.063

0.079
0.279*

0.095
0.002

0.132*** -0.678*** 0.165***

No. of observations = 601; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Mean
-2.769

SD
20.229

1
0.110***

2
-0.046

3
0.039

4
5
-0.138*** -0.287***

6
0.126***

7
-0.489***

13

Country diversity it0 *Alliance
experience it0

14

Firm sizeit1 (log)

10.578

0.716

0.049

0.176***

0.108*

-0.377***

0.364*

0.117***

0.487***

15

Airline type

0.739

0.44

0.094**

0.247***

0.041

-0.327***

0.378***

0.226***

0.705***

16

Repeat allianceit0

4.656

6.498

0.023

-0.045

-0.097*

-0.026

0.731***

0.133***

0.062

17

September 11th, 2001

0.338

0.474

0.023

-0.043

0.509***

0.004

-0.170***

-0.220*** -0.189***

No. of observations = 601; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Mean
Backward
competitor-dominated 1.891
alliance ratio
10 Alliance experience it0

SD

8

2.229

0.736***

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

9

111.085 142.572 0.802***

11 Alliance portfolio size
96.358
it0 (log)* Alliance
experience it0
12 Multilateral alliance
-0.915
ratio it0* Alliance
experience it0
13 Country diversity
-2.769
it0*Alliance
experience it0
14 Firm sizeit1 (log)
15 Airline type
16 Repeat allianceit0
17 September 11th, 2001

0.784***

135.065 0.288***

0.227***

0.431***

17.636

0.111***

0.047

-.000

-0.301***

20.229

-0.146***

-0.182***

-0.283***

-0.062

-0.211***

10.578

0.716

0.395***

0.572***

0.277***

0.284***

-0.004

-0.054

0.739

0.44

0.268***

0.423***

0.335***

0.339***

-0.036

-0.119***

0.820***

4.656

6.498

0.633***

0.822***

0.866***

0.286***

-0.031

-0.264***

0.342***

0.341***

0.338

0.474

0.580***

0.383***

0.644***

0.236***

0.020

-0.158***

-0.123***

-0.081*

0.438***

No. of observations = 601; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 5: Hypotheses 1, DVs-Customer Complaint and Mishandled Baggage
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 1
Customer
Customer
Mishandled
Mishandled
complaintit1
baggage it1
baggage it1
complaintit1
Control variables
Airline type
0.090
0.135
2.759***
2.685***
(0.239)
(0.224)
(0.475)
(0.509)
Firm size it1 (log)
-0.096
-0.288**
-1.405***
-1.231***
(0.145)
(0.140)
(0.264)
(0.288)
September 11th, 2001
-0.734***
-0.992***
-0.479***
-0.253
(0.106)
(0.113)
(0.148)
(0.161)
No. of repeat alliance it1 0.045***
0.011
-0.029**
0.006
(0.009)
(0.011)
(0.013)
(0.016)
Independent variable
Portfolio size it0 (log)
0.322***
-0.312***
(0.057)
(0.0813)
Constant
2.253
3.705***
18.27***
17.00***
(1.407)
(1.345)
(2.560)
(2.771)

Overall R2
0.062
Chi square
52.80***
F-value for change in
R2
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Standard errors in parentheses
No. of observations = 601

0.135
87.40***
49.887***

0.053
63.43***

0.081
80.12***
18.654***
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Table 6: Hypothesis 1, DVs- On-time Arrival and Involuntary Denied Boarding
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
Model 5
On-time
Involuntary
Involuntary
On-time
arrivalit1
denied
denied
arrivalit1
boardingit1
boardingit1
Control variables
Airline type
-0.028
-0.059**
0.256
0.083
(0.022)
(0.025)
(0.327)
(0.354)
Firm size it1 (log)
0.038***
0.073***
-0.911***
-0.706***
(0.011)
(0.012)
(0.164)
(0.181)
September 11th, 2001 0.025***
0.045***
-0.518***
-0.382***
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.083)
(0.091)
No. of repeat alliance
-0.003***
-0.001
0.048***
0.068***
it1

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.407***
(0.110)

-0.022***
(0.003)
0.092
(0.120)

Independent variable
Portfolio size it0 (log)
Constant

Overall R2
.062
Chi square
52.80**
F-value for change in
R2
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Standard errors in parentheses
No. of observations = 601

0.135
87.40**
21.673***

(0.008)

(0.009)

10.40***
(1.597)

-0.170***
(0.046)
8.631***
(1.739)

0.174
75.21***

0.195
88.43***
15.594***
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Hypothesis 2: Multilateral alliance ratio

Hypothesis 2 predicted that the multilateral alliance ratio of an alliance
portfolio is negatively related to customer service quality. Since SDC alliance
database did not report any multilateral alliance formation by America West and
Southwest over the 20-year period, in testing H2 to better detect the effects of
multilateral alliance formation on service quality, America West and Southwest were
removed from the sample. The resultant number of observations is 495 for testing H2.
Tables 7 and 8 present the analyses results of H2.

Customer complaint
The results of model 2 indicate that the overall model (R2 = 0.112, Chi square
= 61.35, p < 0.01) was significant, but the incremental change in R square (F = 3.571,
p < 0.10) was only marginally significant after the multilateral alliance ratio was
entered in addition to the control variables in model 1. The multilateral alliance ratio
(F = -0.510, p < 0.10) was only marginally negatively related to customer complaint,
inconsistent with H2.

Mishandled baggage
Although the results of model 4 indicate that both the overall model (R2 =
0.118, Chi square = 65.18, p < 0.01), and the incremental change in R square (F =
35.015, p < 0.01) were significant after the multilateral alliance ratio was entered, the
multilateral alliance ratio (F = 0.412, p > 0.10) was not significantly related to
mishandled baggage, lending no support to H2.
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On-time arrival
The results of model 6 indicate that the overall model (R2 = 0.114, Chi square
= 63.06, p < 0.01), and the incremental change in R square (F = 18.239, p < 0.01)
were significant after the multilateral alliance ratio was entered. Multilateral alliance
ratio (beta = 0.041, p < 0.01) was positively related to on-time arrival. This result
suggests that as an airline increasingly participates in multilateral alliances, its
on-time arrival rate is higher, thus inconsistent with H2.

Involuntary denied boarding
The results of model 8 suggest that the overall model (R2 = 0.211, Chi square
=130.72, p < 0.01), and the incremental change in R square (F = 16.273, p < 0.01)
were significant after multilateral alliance ratio was entered. Multilateral alliance ratio
(beta = -0.812, p < 0.01) was negatively related to involuntary denied boarding. This
result suggests that as airlines increasingly participate in multilateral alliances, their
involuntary denied boarding is lower, thus inconsistent with H2.
Taken together, the test results suggest that multilateral alliance ratio is not
negatively related to any of the four service quality dimensions. Thus, H2 is not
supported.
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Table 7: Hypothesis 2, DVs-Customer Complaint and Mishandled Baggage
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 1
Customer
Customer
Mishandled
Mishandled
complaintit1 complaintit1
baggage it1
baggage it1
Control variables
Airline type
Firm size it1 (log)
September 11th,
2001
No. of repeat
alliance it1
Independent
variables
Portfolio size it0
(log)

0.086

-0.031

3.509***

0.904**

(0.235)

(0.242)

(0.739)

(0.395)

0.022

0.049

-1.645***

-0.010

(0.120)

(0.120)

(0.346)

(0.196)

-0.624***

-0.611***

-0.498**

-0.082

(0.115)

(0.115)

(0.203)

(0.188)

-0.011

-0.009

0.045**

0.038**

(0.009)

(0.009)

(0.019)

(0.015)

0.255***

0.240***

-0.477***

-0.555***

(0.054)

(0.055)

(0.092)

(0.090)

Multilateral
alliance ratioit0
Constant

-0.510*

0.412

(0.270)

(0.441)

0.562

0.519

21.00***

5.794***

(1.115)

(1.112)

(3.219)

(1.815)

Observations

495

495

495

495

Overall R2

0.105

0.112

0.055

0.118

Chi square

57.49***

61.35***

89.29***

65.18***

F-value for
3.571*
change in R2
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Standard errors in parentheses
No. of observations = 495

35.015***
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Table 8: Hypothesis 2, DVs- On-Time Arrival and Involuntary Denied Boarding
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
Model 5
On-time
On-time
Involuntary
Involuntary
arrivalit1
denied boardingit1 denied boardingit1
arrivalit1
Control variables
Airline type
-0.002
0.054***
0.446**
0.261
(0.022)
(0.014)
(0.177)
(0.181)
Firm size it1 (log) 0.039***
0.006
-0.630***
-0.588***
(0.011)
(0.007)
(0.090)
(0.090)
September 11th, 0.032***
0.018***
-0.152*
-0.131
2001
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.087)
(0.086)
No. of repeat
-0.001
-0.000
0.042***
0.0445***
alliance it1
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.007)
(0.007)
Independent
variables
Portfolio size it0
-0.015*** -0.012*** -0.126***
-0.150***
(log)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.041)
(0.041)
0.041***
-0.812***
Multilateral
alliance ratio it0
(0.016)
(0.201)
Constant
0.396***
0.680***
7.400***
7.332***
(0.103)
(0.065)
(0.841)
(0.829)
0.081
0.114
Overall R2
Chi square
53.61***
63.06***
F-value for
18.239***
2
change in R
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Standard errors in parentheses
No. of observations = 495

0.185
111.01***

0.211
130.72***
16.273***
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Hypothesis 3: Partner country diversity ratio

Hypothesis 3 predicted a negative relationship between partner country
diversity ratio and customer service quality. Since SDC did not report that Southwest
had formed alliances with any foreign partners between 1988 and 2007, in testing H3,
Southwest was removed from the sample. The resultant number of observations was
552. Tables 9 and 10 present the test results of hypothesis 3.

Customer complaint
The results of model 2 indicate that the overall model (R2 = 0.116, Chi square
= 71.83, p < 0.01) was significant, but the incremental change in R square (F = 0.006,
p > 0. 10) was not significant after partner country diversity ratio was entered. Also,
partner country diversity ratio (F = 0.287, p > 0.10) was not significantly related to
customer complaint, providing no support to H3.

Mishandled baggage
The results of model 4 indicate the overall model (R2 = 0.077, Chi square =
71.83, p < 0.01), but the incremental change in R square (F = -9.401, p > 0.10) was
not significant after partner country diversity ratio was entered. Also, partner country
diversity ratio (F = -0.304, p < 0.1) was not significantly related to mishandled
baggage, providing no support to H3.

On-time arrival
Although the results of model 6 indicate that both the overall model (R2 =
0.090, Chi square = 54.05, p < 0.01) and the incremental change in R square (F =

97

9.362, p < 0.01) were significant after partner country diversity ratio was entered,
partner country diversity ratio (F = 0.009, p > 0.1) was not significantly related to
on-time arrival, providing no support to H3.

Involuntary denied boarding
The results of model 8 show that both the overall model (R2 = 0.199, Chi
square = 64.34, p > 0.01) and the incremental change in R square (F = 7.501, p < 0.01)
were significant after partner country diversity ratio was entered. Further, country
diversity ratio (F = 7.501, p < 0.1) was found significantly positively related to
involuntary denied boarding. This significant positive relationship suggests that as
partner country diversity ratio increases, involuntary denied boarding rate becomes
higher, thus lending support to H3.
In sum, despite the three insignificant results, the results provide partial
support to H3 in that as partner country diversity ratio increases, the involuntary
denied boarding rate becomes higher.
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Table 9: Hypothesis 3, DVs-Customer Complaint and Mishandled Baggage
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 1
Customer
Mishandled Mishandled
Customer
complaintit1
baggage it1
baggage it1
complaintit1
Control variables
Airline type
-0.622***
-0.591**
3.067***
3.824***
(0.237)
(0.261)
(0.564)
(0.659)
Firm size it1 (log)
0.087
0.083
-1.298***
-1.711***
(0.137)
(0.137)
(0.305)
(0.343)
September 11th, 2001 -0.824***
-0.829***
-0.412**
-0.510***
(0.125)
(0.126)
(0.177)
(0.179)
No. of repeat allianceit1 -0.017
-0.018
0.040**
0.0317*
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.017)
(0.018)
Independent variables
0.351***
0.358***
-0.460***
-0.398***
Portfolio size it0 (log)
(0.062)
(0.066)
(0.086)
(0.092)
Partner country
-0.082
-0.346
diversity ratio it0
(0.287)
(0.402)
Constant
0.403
0.443
17.61***
21.45***
(1.279)
(1.287)
(2.841)
(3.193)
Overall R2
0.116
Chi square
71.87***
F-value for change in
R2
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Standard errors in parentheses
No. of observations = 552

0.116
71.83***
.006

0.092
92.40***

0.077
101.15***
-9.401
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Table 10: Hypothesis 3, DVs- On-Time Arrival and Involuntary Denied Boarding
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
On-time
On-time
Involuntary
Involuntary
arrivalit1
arrivalit1
denied
denied
boardingit1
boardingit1
Control variables
Airline type
-0.029
0.012
0.451
0.470
(0.020)
(0.014)
(0.452)
(0.479)
Firm size it1 (log)
0.047***
0.015**
-0.777***
-0.876***
(0.012)
(0.007)
(0.209)
(0.219)
September 11th, 2001 0.039***
0.026***
-0.392***
-0.382***
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.103)
(0.103)
No. of repeat alliance
-0.001
0.000
0.066***
0.072***
it1

Independent variables
Portfolio size it0 (log)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.010)

(0.011)

-0.019***
(0.003)

-0.017***
(0.003)

-0.153***
(0.050)

-0.187***
(0.052)

0.343***
(0.104)

0.009
(0.015)
0.635***
(0.068)

9.004***
(1.958)

0.445*
(0.231)
9.883***
(2.046)

Partner country
diversity ratio it0
Constant

Overall R2
0.075
Chi square
69.70***
F-value for change in
R2
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors in parentheses
No. of observations=552

0.090
54.05***
9.362***

0.188
61.20***

0.199
64.34***
7.501***
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Hypothesis 4: Alliance type

Hypothesis 4 predicted that channel-dominated alliance ratio is more
negatively related to customer service quality than backward competitor-dominated
alliance ratio. Since SDC did not report any backward competitor-dominated alliances
by Alaska and America West over the 20-year period, in testing hypothesis 4, these
two airlines were removed from the analysis in order to better detect the effects of
alliance type on service quality. The resultant number of observations was 495. Tables
11 and 12 present the analyses to test hypothesis 4.

Customer complaint
The results of model 2 indicate that the overall model (R2 = 0.201, Chi square
= 122.62, p < 0.01) was significant and channel-dominated alliance ratio (beta = 0.683,
p < 0.01) and backward competitor-dominated alliance ratio (beta = -0.965, p < 0.01)
were found positively related to customer complaint. Yet, the incremental change in R
square (F =14.569, p > 0.10) was insignificant after the channel-dominated alliance
ratio and backward competitor-dominated alliance ratio were entered. Further, a post
regression test suggests that the coefficient difference (Chi square = 1.17, p > 0.10)
between channel-dominated alliance ratio and backward competitor-dominated
alliance ratio was not significant, lending no support to H4.

Mishandled baggage
The results of model 4 indicate that the overall model (R2 = 0.126, Chi square
= 70.19, p < 0.01), but the incremental change in R square (F = 37.612, p > 0.01) was
not significant after the channel-dominated alliance ratio and backward
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competitor-dominated alliance ratio were entered. Further, channel-dominated
alliance ratio (beta = 0.946, p < 0.01) was positively related to mishandled baggage,
but backward competitor-dominated alliance ratio (beta = 0.946, p > 0.10) was not
significantly related to mishandled baggage. Furthermore, a post regression test
suggests that the coefficient difference (Chi square = 2.05, p > 0.10) between
channel-dominated alliance ratio and backward competitor-dominated alliance ratio
was not significant, thus lending no support to H4.

On-time arrival
The results of model 6 suggest that both the overall model (R2 = 0.105, Chi
square = 57.22, p < 0.01) and the incremental change in R square (F = 28.570, p < 0.0
1) were significant after the channel-dominated alliance ratio and backward
competitor-dominated alliance ratio were entered. Channel-dominated alliance ratio
(beta = -.009, p > 0.10) was not significantly related to on-time arrival, but backward
competitor-dominated alliance ratio (beta = -0.06, p < 0.01) was negatively related to
on-time arrival. A post regression test suggests that the coefficient difference (Chi
square = 12.03, p < 0.01) between channel-dominated alliance ratio and backward
competitor-dominated alliance ratio was significant. This result suggests that
backward competitor-dominated alliances are associated with lower on-time arrival
than channel-dominated alliances, inconsistent with H4.

Involuntary denied boarding
The results of model 8 indicate that both the overall model (R2 = 0.241, Chi
square =154.85, p < 0.01) and the incremental change in R square (F = 14.314, p <
0.01) were significant after channel-dominated alliance ratio and backward
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competitor-dominated alliance ratio were entered. Channel-dominated alliance ratio
(beta = -0.675, p < 0.01) was negatively related to involuntary denied boarding but
backward competitor-dominated alliance (beta = -0.225, p > 0.10) was not
significantly related. A post regression test suggests that the coefficient difference
(Chi square = 5.37, p < 0.05) between channel-dominated alliance ratio and backward
competitor- dominated alliance ratio was more negatively related to involuntary
denied boarding than backward competitor-dominated alliance ratio, thus lending
support to H4.
In sum, the results suggest that H4 is supported only when the service quality
dimension is involuntary denied boarding rate such that increases in channeldominated alliances are associated with deteriorating involuntary denied boarding
rate.
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Table 11: Hypothesis 4, DVs-Customer Complaint and Mishandled Baggage
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 1
Customer
Customer
Mishandled
Mishandled
baggage it1
baggage it1
complaintit1 complaintit1
Control variables
Airline type
0.728***
1.339***
1.983***
1.855***
(0.153)
(0.227)
(0.509)
(0.360)
Firm size it1 (log)
0.027
-0.225
-0.991***
-0.040
(0.117)
(0.138)
(0.330)
(0.219)
September 11th, 2001
-0.586***
-0.709***
-0.107
-0.031
(0.115)
(0.122)
(0.194)
(0.193)
No. of repeat allianceit1 -0.009
-0.008
-0.001
0.021
(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.017)
(0.014)
Independent variables
Portfolio size it0 (log)
0.225***
0.279***
-0.292***
-0.421***
(0.052)
(0.055)
(0.086)
(0.088)
Channel-dominated
0.683***
0.946**
alliance ratio it0
(0.244)
(0.386)
0.965***
0.356
Backward
competitor-dominated
alliance ratio it0
(0.266)
(0.421)
Constant
-0.069
1.704
15.02***
4.721**
(1.217)
(1.341)
(3.421)
(2.121)
Overall R2
0.177
Chi square
105.31***
F-value for change in
R2
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Standard errors in parentheses
No. of observations = 495

0.201
122.62***
14.569***

0.059
55.35***

0.126
70.19***
37.612***

104

Table 12: Hypothesis 4, DVs- On-Time Arrival and Involuntary Denied Boarding
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
On-time
On-time
Involuntary
Involuntary
arrivalit1
arrivalit1
denied
denied
boardingit1
boardingit1
Control variables
Airline type
-0.028*
-0.039***
-0.343***
-0.737***
(0.015)
(0.013)
(0.114)
(0.170)
Firm size it1 (log)
0.039***
0.016*
-0.654***
-0.457***
(0.011)
(0.008)
(0.087)
(0.103)
September 11th, 2001
0.030***
0.019***
-0.180**
-0.052
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.086)
(0.091)
-0.001
0.000
0.045***
0.037***
No. of repeat allianceit1
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.006)
(0.007)
Independent variables
Portfolio size it0 (log)
-0.014***
-0.017***
-0.134***
-0.122***
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.039)
(0.041)
Channel-dominated
-0.009
-0.675***
alliance ratio it0
(0.014)
(0.182)
-0.060***
-0.225
Backward
competitor-dominated
alliance ratio it0
(0.015)
(0.199)
Constant
0.415***
0.698***
8.469***
6.855***
(0.111)
(0.078)
(0.908)
(1.001)
0.053
Overall R2
Chi square
45.90***
2
F-value for change in R
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Standard errors in parentheses
No. of observations = 495

0.105
57.22***
28.570***

0.219
137.16***

0.241
154.85***
14.314***
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Hypothesis 5a: Interaction between alliance portfolio size and alliance experience

H5a predicted that alliance experience moderates the effects of alliance
portfolio size on service quality such that as alliance experience increases, the
relationship between alliance portfolio size and service quality becomes less negative
or more positive. Table 13 and 14 presents the analyses to test hypothesis 5a.

Customer complaint
The results of model 2 indicate that both the overall model (R2 = 0.145, Chi
square = 88.80, p > 0.01) and the incremental change in R square (F = 14.569, p < 0.
01) were significant after the alliance portfolio size*alliance experience was entered.
Yet, the interaction term, alliance portfolio size* alliance experience (beta = -0.001, p >
0.10), was not significantly related to customer complaint, lending no support to H5a.

Mishandled Baggage
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10.15

alliance
experience
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8.15

alliance
experience
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6.15
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alliance portfolio size alliance portfolio size
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Figure 2: Interaction Effect of Alliance Portfolio Size and Alliance Experience on
Mishandled Baggage

106

Mishandled baggage
The results of model 4 indicate the overall model (R2 = 0.117, Chi square =
134.20, p < 0.01), and the incremental change in R square (F = 8.864, p < 0.01) after
the interaction term, alliance portfolio size* alliance experience, was entered. The
interaction term, alliance portfolio size* alliance experience (beta = 0.005, p < 0.01),
was positively related to mishandled baggage. I followed the recommendation of
Cohen et al. (2003) to plot the interaction in Figure 2. The plot suggests that when
alliance experience is high, increases in alliance portfolio size lead to higher
mishandled baggage rate, inconsistent with H5a.

On-time arrival
The results of model 6 indicate the overall model (R2 = 0.134, Chi square =
135.84, p < 0.01) and the incremental change in R square (F = 5.682, p < 0.05) were
significant after alliance portfolio size *alliance experience was entered. The
interaction term, alliance portfolio size *alliance experience (beta = -0.000, p < 0.01)
was significantly negatively related to on-time arrival. Figure 3 plots the interaction
and suggests that when alliance experience is low, the larger an airline’s alliance
portfolio size, the higher on-time arrival. But when alliance experience is high,
increases in alliance portfolio size are associated with lower on-time arrival rate. This
is inconsistent with H5a prediction.
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Table 13: Hypothesis 5a, DVs-Customer Complaint and Mishandled Baggage
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Customer
Customer
Mishandled
Mishandled
complaintit1
complaintit1
baggage it1
baggage it1
Control variables
Airline type
0.135
-0.212
2.685***
2.193***
(0.224)
(0.285)
(0.509)
(0.761)
Firm size it1 (log)
-0.288**
-0.190
-1.231***
-1.625***
(0.140)
(0.172)
(0.288)
(0.360)
September 11th,
-0.992***
-1.189***
-0.253
-1.115***
2001
(0.113)
(0.142)
(0.161)
(0.200)
No. of repeat
0.011
0.008
0.006
-0.002
allianceit1
(0.011)
(0.019)
(0.016)
(0.032)
Independent
variables
Alliance portfolio
0.322***
0.415***
-0.312***
0.321**
size it0 (log)
(0.0571)
(0.104)
(0.081)
(0.159)
Alliance experience
0.000
-0.002
it0

Alliance portfolio
size it0 (log)* Alliance
experience it0
Constant

3.705***
(1.345)

0.145
Overall R2
Chi square
88.80***
F-value for change in
R2
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Standard errors in parentheses
No. of observations = 601

(0.001)
0.001

(0.002)
0.005***

(0.001)
2.661
(1.629)

(0.001)
20.050***
(3.432)

0.1309
90.88***
-9.279

17.000***
(2.771)
0.104
105.24***

0.117
134.20***
8.864***
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Table 14: Hypothesis 5a, DVs- On-time Arrival and Involuntary Denied
Boarding
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
On-time
On-time
Involuntary
Involuntary
arrivalit1
arrivalit1
denied
denied
boarding it1
boarding it1
Control variables
Airline type
-0.059**
-0.019
0.0828
0.129
(0.025)
(0.029)
(0.35)
(0.44)
Firm size it1 (log)
0.073***
0.064***
-0.706***
-0.655***
(0.012)
(0.014)
(0.18)
(0.21)
September 11th,
0.045***
0.073***
-0.382***
-0.371***
2001
(0.006)
(0.008)
(0.091)
(0.12)
No. of repeat
-0.001
0.001
0.068***
0.046**
allianceit1
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.009)
(0.018)
Independent
-0.022***
-0.037***
-0.170***
-0.267***
variables
Alliance portfolio
(0.003)
(0.006)
(0.046)
(0.091)
size it0 (log)
Alliance experience

-0.000

0.002

(0.000)
-0.000***

(0.001)
-0.001

8.631***
(1.74)

(0.001)
8.289***
(1.99)

0.203
89.97***

0.212
89.56***

it0

Alliance portfolio
size it0 (log)*
Alliance experience
it0

Constant

0.092
(0.12)

(0.000)
0.198
(0.13)

Overall R2
Chi square

0.126
122.31***

0.134
135.84***

F-value for change
in R2
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Standard errors in parentheses
No. of observations = 601

5.682**

6.547**
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Figure 3: Interaction Effect of Alliance Portfolio Size and Alliance Experience
on On-Time Arrival

Involuntary denied boarding
The results of model 8 indicate the overall model (R2 = 0.212, Chi square =
89.56, p < 0.01) and the incremental change in R square (F = 6.547, p < 0.05) were
significant after the interaction term, alliance portfolio size *alliance experience was
entered. The interaction term (beta = -0.001, p > 0.10) was not significantly related to
involuntary denied boarding, lending no support to H5a.
In sum, the test results suggest that as alliance experience does not positively
moderate the relationship between alliance portfolio size and customer service quality
with respect to any of the four service dimensions. Thus, H5a was not supported.
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Hypothesis 5b: Interaction between multilateral alliance ratio and alliance
experience

H5b predicted that alliance experience enhances the relationship between
multilateral alliance ratio and customer service quality. As with testing hypothesis 2,
similarly in testing H5b, America West and Southwest were removed from the sample
because these two airlines were not reported to have any multilateral alliances. The
resultant number of observations is 495. Tables 15 and 16 present the analyses to test
hypothesis 5b.

Customer complaint
The results of model 2 show that both the overall model (R2 = 0.138, Chi
square = 78.03, p > 0.01), and the incremental change in R square (F = 5.245 p < 0.05)
were significant after multilateral alliance ratio*alliance experience was entered.
Multilateral alliance ratio*alliance experience (beta = -0.009, p < 0.05) was negatively
related to customer complaint. The interaction plot is presented in Figure 4 and
suggests that when alliance experience is high, as multilateral alliance ratio increases,
customer complaint ratio decreases, thus lending support to H5b.

111

8.25

Customer Complaint

7.25

alliance
experience
low

6.25
5.25

alliance
experience
high

4.25
3.25
2.25
1.25
0.25

multilateral alliance
ratio low

multilateral alliance
ratio high

Figure 4: Interaction Effect of Multilateral Alliance Ratio and Alliance
Experience on Customer Complaint

Mishandled baggage
The results of model 4 indicate the overall model (R2 = 0.166, Chi square =
96.70, p < 0.01) was significant but the incremental change in R square (F = 0.058, p >
0.10) was not significant after interaction term, multilateral alliance ratio* alliance
experience, was entered. Further, multilateral alliance ratio * alliance experience (beta
= -0.002, p > 0.10) was not significantly related to mishandled baggage, lending no
support to H5b.
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Table 15: Hypothesis 5b, DVs-Customer Complaint and Mishandled Baggage
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Customer
Customer
Mishandled
Mishandled
complaintit1
complaintit1
baggage it1
baggage it1
Control variables
Airline type
-0.233
-0.535*
0.353
0.288
(0.249)
(0.280)
(0.399)
(0.45)
Firm size it1 (log)
0.083
0.155
0.0825
0.098
(0.120)
(0.123)
(0.192)
(0.20)
September 11th,
2001
-0.868***
-0.857***
-0.784***
-0.781***
(0.141)
(0.140)
(0.226)
(0.23)
No. of repeat
allianceit1
-0.036***
-0.041***
-0.034*
-0.035*
(0.012)
(0.013)
(0.020)
(0.020)
Independent
variables
Alliance portfolio
size it0 (log)
0.197***
0.229***
-0.673***
-0.666***
(0.056)
(0.058)
(0.090)
(0.093)
Alliance experience
0.002***
0.002***
0.006***
0.006***
it0
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Multilateral alliance
ratio it0
-0.524*
-1.441***
0.375
0.177
(0.268)
(0.481)
(0.429)
(0.77)
Multilateral alliance
ratio it0* Alliance
experience it0
-0.009**
-0.002
(0.003)
(0.006)
Constant
0.402
0.019
5.475***
5.393***
(1.103)
(1.111)
(1.768)
(1.790)
Overall R2
0.129
Chi square
72.13***
F-value for change
in R2
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Standard errors in parentheses
No. of observations = 495

0.138
78.03***
5.245**

0.166
96.78 ***

0.166
96.70***
0.058
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Table 16: Hypothesis 5b, DVs- On-Time Arrival and Involuntary Denied
Boarding
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
On-time
On-time
Involuntary
Involuntary
arrivalit1
arrivalit1
denied
denied
boarding it1
boarding it1
Control variables
Airline type
0.077***
0.097***
0.172
0.339
(0.014)
(0.016)
(0.187)
(0.211)
Firm size it1 (log)
0.002
-0.002
-0.573***
-0.613***
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.090)
(0.093)
September 11th, 2001 0.048***
0.047***
-0.245**
-0.251**
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.106)
(0.106)
No. of repeat
allianceit1
0.003***
0.003***
0.033***
0.036***
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.009)
(0.009)
Independent variables
Alliance portfolio
size it0 (log)
-0.007**
-0.010***
-0.170***
-0.188***
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.042)
(0.043)
Alliance experience
-0.000***
-0.000***
0.001*
0.001*
it0
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Multilateral alliance
ratio it0
0.043***
0.104***
-0.818***
-0.308
(0.015)
(0.027)
(0.201)
(0.361)
Multilateral alliance
ratio it0* Alliance
0.001***
0.005*
experience it0
(0.000)
(0.003)
Constant
0.693***
0.719***
7.280***
7.493***
(0.063)
(0.063)
(0.827)
(0.835)
Overall R2
0.183
Chi square
108.92***
F-value for change in
R2
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Standard errors in parentheses
No. of observations = 495

0.195
117.52***
7.182***

0.217
134.70***

0.221
138.10***
2.871*
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Figure 5: Interaction Effect of Multilateral Alliance Ratio and Alliance
Experience on On-Time Arrival

On-time arrival
The results of model 6 indicate that both the overall model (R2 = 0.195, Chi
square = 117.52, p < 0.01) and the incremental change in R square (F = 7.182, p <
0.01) were significant after multilateral alliance ratio* alliance experience was entered.
Alliance portfolio size * alliance experience (beta = 0.001, p < 0.01) was significantly
positively related to on-time arrival. The interaction plot presented in Figure 5
suggests that alliance experience positively moderates the relationship between
multilateral alliance ratio and on-time arrival such that as multilateral alliance ratio
increases, the higher alliance experience, the higher on-time arrival rate. On the other
hand, under the low alliance experience condition, as a multilateral alliance ratio
increases, on-time arrival is associated with a slight decrease. This finding is
consistent with H5b.
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Figure 6: Interaction Effect of Multilateral Alliance Ratio and Alliance
Experience on Involuntary Denied Boarding

Involuntary denied boarding
The results of model 8 indicate that the overall model (R2 = 0.221, Chi square
= 138.10, p < 0.01) was significant and the incremental change in R square (F = 2.871,
p < 0.10) was marginally significant after the interaction term of multilateral alliance
ratio* alliance experience was entered. Alliance portfolio size*alliance experience
(beta = 0.005, p > 0.10) was marginally positively related to involuntary denied
boarding. Figure 6 plots the interaction and suggests that when alliance experience is
high, increase in multilateral alliances is associated with higher involuntary denied
boarding, thus inconsistent with H5b.
In sum, H5 results indicate that as alliance experience increases, the effects of
multilateral alliance ratio on consumer complaint and on-time arrival were improved,
although involuntary denied boarding worsened.
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Chapter 4 presented the research methodology to collect the data and test the
proposed hypotheses. A discussion of the results, managerial implications, and
limitations and future research appears in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION

This chapter consists of four sections. The first section summarizes and
discusses the results reported in chapter 4. The second section discusses managerial
implications. In the third section, the limitations of this dissertation and implications
for future research are discussed. Lastly, a conclusion is presented.

Discussion of Results

This dissertation seeks to investigate the paradoxical effects of alliance
participation, specifically, on customer service quality. In the context of the U.S.
airline industry, managers are constantly pressured to enhance revenues and contain
costs. Participating in alliance becomes an attractive strategy because alliances allow
airlines to obtain benefits that are hard to obtain on their own. Yet, alliances are a
complex organizational form that involves managing independent partners to
accomplish interdependent alliance tasks, demanding substantial time and effort of the
boundedly rational managers. Increased alliance participation may overtax managers’
capability in managing all aspects of customer service quality.
Customer service quality is an important organizational outcome especially in
the U.S. airline industry. As noted earlier, Luo (2007) reported that Southwest Airlines’
one percent increase in its customer complaints could lead to a $262 million loss in its
stock returns, and American Airlines’ one percent decrease in customer complaints
would result in a substantial gain of $138 million from the stock market. Given the
importance of customer service quality, if negative alliance effects on customer
service quality exist, then an alliance paradox emerges.
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Using longitudinal archival data of nine major U.S. airlines over a 20-year
period, the effects of four alliance portfolio attributes (i.e., alliance portfolio size,
multilateral alliance ratio, alliance partner country diversity, and alliance type) on
customer service quality were first examined. Then, the moderating effects of alliance
experience were tested. Table 17 provides a summary of the findings.
Altogether, as shown in Table 17, out of the 24 predicted relationships
between alliance portfolio attributes and the four dimensions of service quality, only 6
were consistent with the hypotheses. Surprisingly, the results show that none of the
hypothesized relationships were supported on all the four service quality dimensions.
That is, although a hypothesis was supported on some service quality dimensions,
inconsistent (opposite) or insignificant effects were reported on other dimensions. For
example, as with H1, the effects of alliance portfolio size were confirmed on customer
complaint and on-time arrival as predicted. However, the effects of alliance portfolio
size on mishandled baggage and involuntary denied boarding were opposite to the H1
prediction.
This suggests that the relationships between alliance portfolio attributes and
customer service quality are more complicated than initially proposed, thus creating a
challenge in interpreting the results. In interpreting the results of H1-4, if there is at
least one confirmed relationship, I interpret it as supported. This result interpretation
strategy is consistent with the view of service as a total experience (Bowen & Ford,
2002), which posits that service is a holistic experience in that a drop in any key
aspect of a customer’s service experience leads to lower service quality experienced
and perceived by customers. This is a valid argument. Suppose a passenger’s flight
arrived on time and she was not denied boarding, she would still perceive low service
quality if her baggage were lost.
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Similarly, in interpreting the results of H5a and H5b, if there is a result that
suggests alliance experience negatively moderates the relationship between alliance
portfolio size, multilateral alliance ratio and customer service quality, I interpret that
hypothesis as not supported. This result interpretation strategy of H5 is also consistent
with the view of service as a total experience because customers may have negative
evaluations of their service experience if service deteriorates in some dimensions
despite improvements in other dimensions.
H1 predicted a negative relationship between alliance portfolio size and
customer service quality. Even though alliance portfolio size was associated with
service improvements in mishandled baggage and involuntary denied boarding, the
results suggest that alliance portfolio size was associated with higher customer
complaints and lower on-time arrival rate. Thus, H1 was supported. As opposed to
other studies that found positive relationships between alliance portfolio size and firm
performance (e.g., Baum et al., 2000; Shan et al., 1994), this finding suggests that
increasingly participating in a large number of alliances does constrain boundedly
rational managers’ capabilities of dealing with the inherent alliance complexities and
thus may end up with lower customer service quality.
H2 predicted a negative relationship between multilateral alliance ratio and
customer service quality. Surprisingly, this prediction was not supported on any of the
four dimensions. This finding is inconsistent with the arguments that multilateral
alliances are more complex to manage (Hwang & Burgers, 1997; Zeng & Chen, 2003).
A possible explanation is that despite the inherent higher alliance complexities,
airlines pay more attention to cooperating in multilateral alliance than in bilateral
alliances due to higher level of alliance identification. Zeng and Chen proposed that
“Alliance partners [in a multilateral alliance] will be less likely to cooperate with each
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other when they have a low rather than a high level of identification with the alliance”
(p. 596). It is possible that airlines in multilateral alliances (e.g., SkyTeam, Star
Alliance and Oneworld) have higher level identification with the alliance, and are
more committed to alliance cooperation.
H3 predicted that alliance partner country diversity is negatively related to
customer service quality. The results show that even though alliance partner country
diversity was not significantly related to customer service quality with respect to
customer complaint, mishandled baggage, and on-time arrival, increasing partner
country diversity was positively related to involuntary denied boarding. In line with
the result interpretation strategy (i.e., service as a total experience), H3 was supported.
This finding is consistent with the idea that increasing geographic scope creates
higher management complexity and thus is associated with lower performance
(Goerzen & Beamish, 2005).
H4 predicted that channel-dominated alliance ratio is more negatively related
to service quality than backward competitor-dominated alliance ratio. The results
show that channel-dominated alliance ratio was more positively related to involuntary
boarding, thus, confirming H4. This finding suggests that different types of alliances
demand different levels of alliance management capabilities (Rothaermel & Deeds,
2006), and thus are associated with different effects on customer service quality.
H5a predicted that alliance experience positively moderates the relationship
between alliance portfolio size and customer service quality. The results did not
support H5a on any of the four dimensions. Moreover, the results suggest that as
alliance experience increases, the negative effects of alliance experience on
mishandled baggage became more severe. H5b predicted that alliance experience
positively moderates the relationship between multilateral alliance ratio and customer

121

service quality. Even though the results show that alliance experience improved the
effects of multilateral alliance ratio on customer complaints and on-time arrival, the
effect of multilateral alliance ratio on involuntary boarding worsened. In line with the
“service as a total experience” approach, I interpret H5 as not supported. As opposed
to other research that found positive effects of alliance experience (e.g., Hoang &
Rothaermel, 2005; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006), this finding indicates that customer
service quality of airlines does not improve as their alliance experience accumulates
over the years.
Overall, three out of five hypotheses received support (i.e., H1, H3, and H4).
This finding unveils the alliance paradox and suggests that alliance participation does
cause harm to customer service quality. Specifically, increases in alliance portfolio
size, partner country diversity and channel-dominated alliances (compared with
backward competitor-dominated alliances) are associated with lower customer service
quality.
The next section discusses the limitations of this dissertation and continues
with suggestions for future research.
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Table 17: Summary of Results

Customer Service Quality

H1: Alliance portfolio
size
H2: Multilateral alliance
ratio
H3: Partner country
diversity ratio
H4:Channel-dominated
alliance ratio versus
Backward
competitor-dominated
alliance ratio
H5a: Alliance portfolio
size *Alliance experience
H5b:Multilateral alliance
ratio * Alliance
experience

Customer
complaints

Mishandled
baggage

On-time
arrival

Involuntary
denied
boarding

consistent a

inconsistent b

consistent

inconsistent

inconsistent

insignificant c

inconsistent inconsistent

insignificant insignificant

insignificant consistent

insignificant insignificant

inconsistent

consistent

insignificant

inconsistent

inconsistent

insignificant

consistent

insignificant

consistent

inconsistent

a: “consistent” denotes that the result is consistent with the hypothesized prediction,
and lends support to the corresponding hypothesis.
b: “inconsistent” denotes that the result is opposite to the hypothesized prediction.
c: “insignificant” denotes that the relationship is not significant.
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Limitations and Future research
There are several limitations of this dissertation. First, given the data
limitation, some potential interaction effects between the independent variables were
not studied. For example, the multilateral competitor-dominated alliances may have
different effects on service quality from multilateral channel-dominated alliances.
Future research may study the interaction effects of the independent variables in this
dissertation. Using the companies that are both available in American Customer
Service Index (ACSI) database and SDC database may result in sufficient sample size
and thus facilitate such inquiries.
Second, the alliance experience moderating effects on partner country
diversity and alliance type were not studied in this dissertation. Future study may
investigate these two interactions. Also, the positive moderating effect of alliance
experience on multilateral alliances was not confirmed. Probably, this happened
because I did not specifically measure an airline’s experience with multilateral
alliance. It may be possible that an airline’s alliance experience was only gained from
dealing with bilateral alliances, thus was not effective in managing multilateral
alliances.
Third, given the data unavailability, I did not control for the effects of
dedicated alliance functions. Kale, Dyer and Singh (2002) argued that alliance
experience is a crude proxy for alliance management capability. They found that firms
with a dedicated alliance function had better performance. Future studies may
investigate the effects of a dedicated alliance function on service quality.
Fourth, this dissertation has encountered a challenge in interpreting the
hypotheses due to the lack of a good weighting system of the four airline service
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dimensions. Even though Bowen and Headley (1991) developed a weighting system
in their Airline Quality Ratings (AQR), their weighting system was based on a survey
of airline managers’ perceptions of the importance of these dimensions. Thus, AQR
does not accurately capture the service quality evaluation from the customers’
perspectives. As a result, future studies may first survey airline passengers to generate
a weighting system that reflects customers’ evaluations of the importance of these
four dimensions and then create a composite score of service quality.
Fifth, despite the notable strengths of the SDC database, its alliance data may
have compromised the analyses results. The alliance termination rate recorded in SDC
database is relatively low in that only 5 out of 351 alliance announcements are
alliance terminations. It is possible that airlines did not publicly announce their
alliance terminations to avoid negative publicity. This lack of alliance termination
data may have created severe threats to the alliance variables in this dissertation
because some alliances are probably only short-term arms-length market transactions.
Future research may involve interviews with the airline managers in the related
functions to verify the durations of each alliance investigated in this dissertation.
Sixth, researchers may conduct qualitative studies to help understand the
findings of this dissertation. This dissertation is built on the theoretical premise of
managers’ bounded rationality (March & Simon, 1958). The bounded rationality
argument presupposes that the alliance participation dampens the various alliance
benefits. Surprisingly, several analyses results are in the opposite direction to the
hypothesized relationships (see Table 17). These inconsistent results suggest that
bounded rationality is at work but insufficient to explain all the results reported in this
dissertation. Future research may include qualitative studies such as interviews with
airline managers to understand, for example, why multilateral alliances were
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associated with improvements in customer complaints, on-time arrival and
involuntary denied boarding in testing H2, and why backward competitor-dominated
alliances were more negatively related to on-time arrival than channel-dominated
alliances in testing H4.
Seventh, future research may use different regression procedures and time lags
to validate the results reported in this dissertation. This dissertation used random
panel regressions to test the hypotheses. Future research may use difference in
difference regressions to detect the differential effects of alliances on service quality
to corroborate the results reported in this dissertation. Also, future research may use
different time lags such as 6 months or 12 months to compare the results because it is
possible that under certain circumstances, the time lag of 3 months may not be long
enough for the alliance effects to show on service quality.
Lastly, since this dissertation relied on data from a single, unique industry,
future research should cross-validate the results of this dissertation in other industries.
As mentioned earlier, using data from ACSI and SDC databases is a viable approach.
Managerial Implications

Participating in alliances provides potential financial benefits such as revenue
enhancements from greater market access and cost reductions. Yet, managers are
constrained by their limited time and effort to manage the inherently complex alliance
relationships. I hope to demonstrate that alliance participation may have unintended
consequences, particularly as it relates to customer service quality, that managers
should be aware of. As a result, managers should look at the full consequences of
alliance participation, not just revenue enhancements or cost reductions, when
contemplating alliance arrangements.
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The results of this dissertation indicated that although alliance participation
provides critical benefits to the airlines, when the total number of existing alliances is
high, the drop in customer service with respect to customer complaints and on-time
arrival was observed. Therefore, managers should also pay more attention to
mishandled baggage and involuntary denied boarding. Also, as airlines pursue
international alliances, they should be more attentive to the issues related to
involuntary denied boarding.
Another implication for the airline managers is that channel-dominated alliance
ratio has more detrimental effects on involuntary denied boarding than backward
competitor-dominated alliance ratio. This suggests that managers should increase their
interfirm coordination efforts with, for example, its ticket sales agents and ticket
reservation websites to ensure accurate flight information.
Also, since the moderating effects of alliance experience were not significant,
airline managers should seek other more active means to manage alliances, such as
setting up a dedicated function to coordinate alliance activities in order enhance
alliance performance (Kale et al., 2002).
Given the currently heightened pressure to lower costs and enhance revenues,
participating in airline alliances is an attractive strategy even to ensure airline survival.
Interestingly, this dissertation reported that participating in multilateral alliances does
not hurt service quality. Thus, managers should consider participating more in
multilateral alliances such as SkyTeam, Star Alliance and Oneworld than in bilateral
alliances.
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Conclusion

This dissertation makes three important contributions. First, this dissertation
contributes to alliance research by exploring the potential dark side of alliance
participation. The results unveiled an alliance paradox. Despite the potential alliance
benefits, managing interdependent alliance activities performed by independent firms
to produce and deliver products/services creates substantial alliance management
complexity. Since managers are limited in their available time and effort, despite their
best effort, as airlines increasingly participate in a large number of alliances, or form
alliances with partners from diverse countries, boundedly rational managers fail to
effectively manage alliances and end up with disappointing customer service quality.
Second, this dissertation also contributes to services marketing research by
studying alliance portfolio attributes as potential antecedents to service quality. As
shown in the literature review, no empirical research to date has investigated the
alliance portfolio effects on service quality. This dissertation suggests that the
attributes of the multiple alliances that a firm currently manages have substantial
effects on its service quality.
Third, this dissertation provides the first examination of the moderating effects
of alliance experience on the relationships between alliance portfolio attributes and
customer service quality. Contrary to the findings reported in studies that use financial
performance measures or production innovations as proxies for firm performance
(Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006), this dissertation shows that when customer service
quality is brought into the mix of alliance research as a dependent variable, alliance
experience does not have positive moderating effects.
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